Charles Guiteau and the Christian Nation by Weisbrod, Carol
University of Connecticut
OpenCommons@UConn
Faculty Articles and Papers School of Law
1989
Charles Guiteau and the Christian Nation
Carol Weisbrod
University of Connecticut School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_papers
Part of the Law and Psychology Commons, and the Law and Society Commons
Recommended Citation
Weisbrod, Carol, "Charles Guiteau and the Christian Nation" (1989). Faculty Articles and Papers. 321.
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_papers/321
? ???? ?????
Citation: 7 J. L. & Religion 187 1989 
Content downloaded/printed from 
HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org)
Mon Aug 15 18:31:42 2016
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
   https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do?  
   &operation=go&searchType=0   
   &lastSearch=simple&all=on&titleOrStdNo=0748-0814




This issue of the Journal of Law and Religion, dedicated to the
memory of Robert M. Cover, publishes a variety of work in his honor.
Some of that work takes Cover's scholarship as its subject. Other
pieces may stand in a less direct, but no less important, relation to
Cover's interests. The following article on the trial of Charles
Guiteau is in the second category. The direct citations to Cover seem
less significant than the larger sense in which this piece is connected
to fundamental themes in Cover's work.
The trial of Charles Guiteau for the assassination of James Gar-
field is used as the point of entry for a treatment of law and religion in
19th century America. A biblical text, Genesis 22, provides a focus
for a discussion of a culture engaged in a debate over science and
religion. This in itself would have interested Bob Cover, who was
deeply concerned with the multiple meanings of religious and other
normative texts as well as with problems of legal pluralism and the
reality of competing normative orders. The relationship of official law
and higher law, with an emphasis on the role of the judge, was the
focus of Cover's Justice Accused. Problems of legal pluralism and of
law and violence, were the subjects of much of the work that fol-
lowed, including the discussion of conflict underlying the idea of "re-
dundant jurisdiction" and the treatment of multiple ordering in
"Nomos and Narrative." Placed in this framework, the trial of
Guiteau litigated the issue of individual antinomianism, the ultimate
problem of pluralism.
While Cover's substantive concerns are well known, his scholarly
method-artificially divided here from substance-is commented
upon less often. Cover's work was sometimes historical, in the sense
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that its subject and materials were located in the past., But it was
never narrowly historical. His reading, his range of reference, and the
level of question which absorbed him went far beyond what would be
common in the work of professional historians. At the same time, the
detail of his historical discussion was deeper than is common in the
work of professional legal academics. Cover transformed the com-
mon idea of the law teacher as not limited by disciplinary constraints
(though limited, often, by the need to know something fast for some
particular purpose) into the model of the law teacher as intellectual,
driven, if anything, by the need to know for itself, and the need to
integrate in order to know. Cover easily engaged a number of the
"Law Ands" of current academic life. No one of those would have
defined his interests. In this, Cover provided encouragement directly
and by example for those whose aspirations and understandings were
in the same direction. For this reason also, the present inquiry, deal-
ing with materials from law, medicine, and religion, however prob-
lematic it might be from the point of view of specialists, is one to
which Cover would, I think, have been sympathetic. It seems to me
appropriate that this article should be published as part of a special
issue dedicated to him.
On July 21, 1881, Charles Guiteau shot President James Garfield
in the train station in Washington, D.C. Garfield lingered for some
time and finally died on September 19, 1881. Guiteau was found fit to
stand trial and his trial lasted over two months. The significant pub-
licity which attended the trial was commented upon by prosecution
psychiatrist John Gray: "[u]nder our form of government, a crime of
this nature still continues to be so phenomenal in its character as to
excite speculation to the highest degree when searching for some pos-
sible and adequate motive."'
1. Gray, Guiteau, "The Guiteau Trial" 38 Am. J. Insanity 303, 304 (1882) [hereinafter
Gray, The Guiteau Trial].
The basic secondary work on the Guiteau trial is C. ROSENBERG, THE TRIAL OF THE
ASSASSIN GUITEAU: PSYCHIATRY AND LAW IN THE GILDED AGE (1968) [hereinafter RO-
SENBERG], which offers a full narrative of the trial and includes a useful bibliographic essay.
The basic source is the text of the trial, which has been republished in two volumes. The
United States v Charles .Guiteau, Mental Illness and Social Policy: The American Experi-
ence (1973) [hereinafter Trial].
I have attempted here to argue from particular religious references to an underlying intel-
lectual orientation. This attempt, to the extent that these references are not, of course, the only
references made, results in a distortion of the whole. The trial was not, after all, dominated by
debate over the story of Abraham and Isaac in Genesis 22.
This distortion can be corrected by reading Professor Rosenberg's fine account of the
trial. ROSENBERG, supra. There is no claim here that an understanding of the Guiteau trial
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Guiteau, by counsel, formally defended the case on the basis of
the insanity defense, arguing that he was too lacking in mental capac-
ity to be found criminally accountable for the murder of the Presi-
dent. However, throughout his trial, Guiteau himself, serving as if he
were his own counsel, argued a somewhat different defense, compar-
ing himself to the Biblical Abraham2 and defending on the basis of
which included the religious dimension was the dominant understanding of the culture. That
is, there is no claim that this reading reaches the "essence" of the Guiteau trial. See D.
FISCHER, HISTORIANS' FALLACIES: TOWARD A LOGIC OF HISTORICAL THOUGHT (1970).
There is a claim that this way of understanding the trial should be added to our sense of what
the Guiteau trial was about.
This discussion is based on printed sources, and at some points I have used substantially
all the material I had. That is, this is not work in which every quotation is chosen from a set of
similar ones. At the same time, it seems entirely likely that other sources exist somewhere
which reveal similar perspectives.
See also Gaylord, Guiteau's Case, CASE AND COMMENT, July/Aug. 1981, 33-41 (briefly
raising the issue of the possible truth of the revelation); C. ROSENBERG, THE CHOLERA
YEARS: THE UNITED STATES IN 1832, 1849 and 1866 (1962) (providing a very useful back-
ground of the changes in the intensity of religious concerns in the 19th century). For a fic-
tional appearance of Guiteau, see J. OATES, A BLOODSMOOR ROMANCE 107, 247 (1982).
The significance of a religious orientation in late 19th century America is beyond debate.
See Friedman, Exposed Nerves; Some Thoughts on Our Changing Legal Culture, 17 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 529 539 (1983) (referring to a quasi-official religion). See also L. FRIEDMAN,
TOTAL JUSTICE 113-14 (1985). The problem is to find specific indications of impact.
Tracing intellectual influences of any kind can present difficulties. This is true even with
reference to social Darwinist influence, which seems to show up less often than one might have
expected. See A. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR
AND BENCH 1887-1895 22, 23 n.10 (1969) ("Although Spencerian Social Darwinism was
doubtless an important ingredient in the ideology of laissez-faire conservatism, only a very few
of the hundreds of bar association speeches examined for this study contained specific refer-
ences to Spencer.") see also Hollinger, Spencer, Scientism and American Constitutional Law, 33
ANNALS OF SCIENCE 476 (1976) ("Social Darwinism can now claim a dubious honor, that it
can be shown not to have existed in more places than has any other movement in the history of
social history.") (I am grateful to Avi Soifer for providing me with this reference.)
2. See Genesis 22:
1. AND it came to pass after these things, that God did tempt Abraham, and said
unto him, Abraham: and he said, Behold, here I am.
2. And he said, Take now thy son, thine only son, Isaac, whom thou lovest, and get
thee into the land of Mo-ri-ah; and offer him there for a burnt offering upon one of
the mountains which I will tell thee of.
3. And Abraham rose up early in the morning, and saddled his ass, and took two of
his young men with him, and Isaac his son, and clave the wood for the burnt offering,
and rose up, and went unto the place which God had told him.
4. Then on the third day Abraham lifted up his eyes, and saw the place afar off.
5. And Abraham said unto his young men, Abide ye here with the ass; and I and the
lad will go yonder and worship, and come again to you.
6. And Abraham took the wood of the burnt offering, and laid it upon Isaac his son;
and he took the fire in his hand, and a knife; and they went both of them together.
7. And Isaac spake unto Abraham his father, and said, My father; and he said, Here
am I, my son. And he said, Behold the fire and the wood: but where is the lamb for a
burnt offering?
8. And Abraham said, My son, God will provide himself a lamb for a burnt offering;
so they went both of them together.
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divine inspiration and responsibility. The jury found Guiteau guilty,
and an appeal failed. The law having declared him sane and responsi-
ble, Charles Guiteau was executed on June 30, 1882.
It is common today for historians to see Guiteau as insane.3 For
instance, Professor James W. Clarke writes that "[w]ith the single ex-
ception of Richard Lawrence [who tried to kill Andrew Jackson in
1835], there has been no American assassin more obviously deranged
than Charles Guiteau." 4 But Clarke's perception is troubling: a
9. And they came to the place which God had told him of; and Abraham built an
altar there, and laid the wood in order, and bound Isaac his son, and laid him on the
altar upon the wood.
10. And Abraham stretched forth his hand, and took the knife to slay his son.
11. And the angel of the Lord called unto him out of heaven, and said, Abraham,
Abraham: and he said, Here am I.
12. And he said, Lay not thine hand upon the lad, neither do thou any thing unto
him: for now I know that thou fearest God, seeing thou has not withheld thy son,
thine only son from me.
13. And Abraham lifted up his eyes, and looked, and behold behind him a ram
caught in a thicket by his horns: and Abraham went and took the ram, and offered
him up for a burnt offering in the stead of his son.
Genesis 22; 1:13 King James Version.
3. John H. Cassity, M.D., said in 1958, "Charles Guiteau was undoubtedly a common
garden variety of paranoid schizophrenia." J. CAsSITY, THE QUALITY OF MURDER 30 (1958).
More recently Tom Wicker commented that, "'[Guiteau] was mad as a hatter'---believing,
among other things, that God had directly instructed him to dispose of Garfield." Wicker,
"How Loose Must the Screw Be?", New York Times Book Review, September 17, 1982. (Re-
view of A. MAYER AND M. WHEELER, THE CROCODILE MAN: A CASE OF BRAIN CHEMIS-
TRY AND CRIMINAL VIOLENCE (1982). Cf H. THOREAU, WALDEN AND OTHER WRITINGS
704 (1950) (on John Brown) ("Newspaper editors argue also that it is proof of his insanity that
he thought he was appointed to do this work which he did-that he did not suspect himself for
a moment! They talk as if it were impossible that a man could be 'divinely appointed' in these
days to do any work whatever..."). See also M. KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBLIC LIFE
IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 267-268 (1977) Oinking Guiteau's insanity to a
description of him as a disappointed office-seeker without discussion of the religious insanity
issue).
Soon after Garfield's inauguration, Guiteau expressed his interest in political positions in
Europe. Thus we get the image of Guitean as a disappointed office seeker. The assassination
of Garfield is said to have expedited civil service reform. See R. HOFSTADTER, ANTI-INTEL-
LECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE 185 (1962). However, Guiteau was in fact not an office
seeker in any ordinary sense. Professor Rosenberg suggests that he was "rather a victim of
mental illness whose delusional system prescribed this role for him." (Rosenberg, supra n. 1, at
ix).
4. J. CLARKE, AMERICAN ASSASSINS: THE DARKER SIDE OF AMERICAN POLITICS 198
(1982). Professor Clarke,: a political scientist, offers a classification of assassins and indicates
that certain assassins (including Guiteau) "are characterized by severe emotional and cognitive
distortion that is expressed in hallucinations and delusions of persecution and/or grandeur.
Their contact with reality is so tenuous that they are usually unable to grasp the significance of
their actions or understand the response of others to them. As a rule, their acts are mystically
or 'divinely' inspired-in a word, irrational or insane." Id at 16. Noting that "ft]hroughout
his lengthy seventy-two-day trial, Guiteau's delusional state was apparent to anyone inclined
to acknowledge it," Professor Clarke offered the history of insanity in the Guiteau family. Id.
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world relatively close to our own, which recognized that the insane
ought not to be punished, nonetheless punished Guiteau.
The problem which requires explanation is thus not the motive
or mindset of Guiteau, whose insanity we are willing to accept, but
that of the culture which hanged him. One explanation for Guiteau's
execution might be that in this instance, insane or not, the murderer
had to die. In his 1968 study of the trial, Professor Charles Rosen-
berg noted: "[Clommon sense suggests that no American jury in 1881
would have dared to vote to acquit Guiteau." 5 Guiteau had to be
hanged because Garfield died, and calling him insane would have ex-
cused him from hanging. In short, the execution of a clearly insane
man can be seen as the act of a vengeful society responding to a man
perceived as a regicide.
One might, as another possibility, probe the option that, while
the insane were not to be punished, the late 19th century view of in-
sanity was not the same as ours. While Guiteau's "eccentricity" was
undeniable, according to Professor Rosenberg, it was not enough for a
defense based on insanity. Guiteau may seem "obviously deranged"
to us and to some of his contemporaries; but the matter of Guiteau's
medical, and then legal, insanity was a much more difficult issue in
the 19th century.
In one sense, the question of Guiteau's sanity hinged on the de-
bate between nonreligious defense psychiatrists Kiernan and Spitzka,
whose arguments were widely understood as dangerous, and more
traditional views, as represented by prosecution psychiatrist John
Gray.
The defense argument was considered an apologetic for evil, and
it raised fears that loose theories of insanity would simply excuse
wickedness in the name of the insanity defense.6
at 209, 210. A major emphasis of the defense psychiatrists at the trial was on this hereditary
insanity.
5. ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 99 ("Few Americans... doubted Guiteau's eccentricity
and peculiarity of temperament. It was equally clear that he would hang.") Rosenberg also
notes that "Americans in 1881, especially those living in rural areas, seemed able to tolerate a
far greater degree of deviant behavior than is ordinarily the case today.... The result was that
one might be a fanatic in religion or politics, even a compulsive thief or murderer, and still
appear to be within the range of responsible behavior." Id at 53-54. This approach was,
however, a matter of "formal beliefs."
Particular cases might yield different results, as where a parent slew his child at the com-
mand of Jehovah. Here, "conventional wisdom found no difficulty" in finding insanity,
although, Rosenberg indicates, a "strict construction" of the legal rules might not permit this.
Id. at 54. On the "Conventional Wisdom" see discussion below, of the responses to the Free-
man case.
6. ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 184-85.
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Prosecution witness Gray, Professor Rosenberg writes, was the
"most prominent American defender of a narrow interpretation of
criminal responsibility and in general a staunch upholder of religion,
social order, and traditional morality. "'7 Gray, a member of the theo-
logically orthodox Reformed Church, "regarded mental hygiene in
significant measure as a problem of religious education," along with
many of his contemporaries. He "saw no possibility of real conflict
between science and religion--except in the case of that 'puffed up'
science which presumed to explain God's moral world in terms of
force and matter."8
This essay considers the Guiteau trial in relation to problems of
religion and law. The present treatment builds on Professor Rosen-
berg's discussion. That study used the Guiteau trial to reach "the
reactions of Americans in the gilded Age to mental illness, to psychia-
try, and to individual character and personality." 9 Rosenberg at-
tempted to reconstruct the trial so as to "create a microcosm of
American psychiatry in the 1880's."10 The enterprise here is a differ-
ent one. In considering the relationships between religion and law in
America, legal scholarship has often focused on specific litigated is-
sues of church and state. Scholarship addressed to legal history, even
when oriented to broad issues of law and society, has tended to stress
problems associated with economic development. While some work
makes plain the importance of connections between religion and law
in general, monographic work which deals with the significance of the
older religious orientation for the American legal system seems much
needed. This reading of the Guiteau trial, which sees the trial as an
intersection of law and religion, and as part of the law of church and
state, is offered as a contribution to that effort.
The Guiteau trial seems appropriate as a vehicle for a broad in-
quiry into the relationship between religion and law in that era, be-
cause of the peculiar drama of the Guiteau trial and because of the
nature of the arguments which Guiteau raised in his defense. Profes-
sor Morton White observed that as a general matter, "catastrophes
are peculiarly suitable aids in tracing the history and development of
ideas and intellectual currents."'" More particularly, as Professor
7. ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 190.
8. Id. at 90.
9. Id. at x.
10. Id. at xii.




Rosenberg suggested in his study, Charles Guiteau "chose unerringly
among the most meaningful values and preconceptions of American
life." Guiteau looked for "success through morality and self-improve-
ment, evangelical religion, enthusiastic politics, and venturesome
business enterprise." 1.2
It is Guiteau's association with, and arguments from, religion
which are of interest here. Guiteau argued that in a Christian Nation,
he should be acquitted of the assassination of the President because he
had been divinely inspired to kill the President. Guiteau "said in so
many words that he did not believe his own plea; he himself thought
the inspiration real and would have been pleased if the jury had
brought him in not guilty, as doing God's will."' 3 He urged, as one
alienist put it, "that the jury should call his inspiration insanity and so
acquit him."1 4 But Guiteau's argument was rejected by the jury.
At the heart of the Guiteau trial is the certainty of the culture
that there was no Divine intervention into national affairs through
Charles Guiteau. As a late nineteenth century psychiatrist, Dr. God-
ding, wrote in his discussion of Guiteau, "[t]he education of the mass
of mankind, if it deals with inspiration at all, treats it as a thing of the
distant past.... For thousands of years it has been the all but univer-
sal belief that direct inspiration is no longer to be expected." 5 This
certainty, this "all but universal belief" was the product of a general
intellectual development of the issue of direct revelation; and in the
Guiteau trial, the certainty of a culture was visible as an aspect of our
civil religion.
In part, this essay details the role of religious belief and action in
American life as it came together in the law of insanity in the late
nineteenth century. The legal categories through which Guiteau's ar-
gument was rejected brought together the law of church and state and
the law of the insanity defense. At the Guiteau trial, there was no
issue of revelation in fact. The fact that there had been no inspiration
12. ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 258.
13. W. IRELAND, THROUGH THE IVORY GATE 216 (1889).
14. Id. at 216.
15. W. GODDING, Two HARD CASES: SKETCHES FROM A PHYSICIAN'S PORTFOLIO 168
(1882). See generally Rosen, Enthusiasm, 42 BULLETIN OF THE HISTORY OF MEDICINE 410
(Sept. 6, 1968).
Godding concluded by saying "for thousands of years it has been the all but universal
belief that direct inspiration is no longer to be expected, and that he who claims now that he
hears the audible voice of God, or with mortal eyes sees the Lord, must be insane." See discus-
sion of sensory claims below.
187]
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or command was taken as given. That raised, then, the issue of belief
and particularly the issue whether a belief could excuse a criminal act.
The "law on religious belief" can be found in different parts of
the legal system ranging from religious tests for public office to ques-
tions of insanity. One part of the law on religious belief is illustrated
by the 1879 Mormon polygamy case, Reynolds v. United States, 6
which held that there was no first amendment (free exercise) defense
to a polygamy prosecution, distinguishing between protection of reli-
gious belief and protection of religious action based on that belief.
Another part of the law, an example of the religious delusion which
would excuse under the insanity defense, is presented by the case of
Charles Freeman, the Pocasset murderer, 17 called "the modem Abra-
ham" by George Beard. 8 This 1879 tragedy involving the death of
Freeman's daughter is important for an understanding of the trial of
Charles Guiteau, because Freeman's case can be seen as the model of
religious insanity against which Guiteau's insanity claim was being
tested. '9
But more importantly, this essay is based on the proposition that
the religious perspectives so evident in the first half of the nineteenth
century had by no means disappeared by the end of the century, and
that they are significant for an understanding of the Guiteau trial.
That religious perspectives infused the culture is evidenced by the fact
that a legal journal discussing Garfield's assassination could include,
without explanation of relevance, both a brief reference to Abraham
and a discussion of Judith and Holofernes.2" Yet the tension in the
culture was clear: "Darwinism, the emerging science of biblical criti-
cism, the increasing knowledge and study of other great religions-
such threats to orthodoxy could not be ignored.. ." in this critical
period in the history of American religion.2 Merle Curti wrote that,
16. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
17. See infra p. 217.
18. G. BEARD, THE CASE OF GUITEAU-A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY 9 (1882).
19. The Pocasset case was one of a number of insane delusion cases discussed which in-
volved divine command. Several of these related specifically to children. See 2 Trial, supra
note 1, at 1538-39. In general, the killing of one's own children, particularly where the killer
was the mother, was often treated as insanity in the 19th century.
20. THE LAW CENTRAL No. 3 (Smith ed. 1881). The Journal also included a comparison
of the cases of Judith and Charlotte Corday (the assassin of Marat) noting that: "There was no
insanity in Judith's case. It was SAGACITY INSPIRED. That was an age when men and
women were permitted to act on the admitted assumption of high incentives from the Al-
mighty; for we are not allowed to suppose that Abraham was insane when he prepared, in the
most solemn manner, to sacrifice and to slay his son." (at 143).
21. Schlesinger, A Critical Period in American Religion, 1875-19M0, 64 PROCEEDINGS OF
MASSACHUSETrS HISTORICAL SOCIETY 522, 524 (1932).
(Vol. 7
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"[t]he most striking event in the intellectual history of the last third of
the nineteenth century was the blow dealt the historic doctrine of su-
pernaturalism-the doctrine that a divine Creator stands above the
laws of nature and intervenes directly in natural events and the affairs
of men through miracles and the granting of grace-by new develop-
ments in the biological and physical sciences."22 At the Guiteau trial,
.one threat to orthodoxy was suggested by the testimony of agnostic
defense psychiatrists; another opposite threat to contemporary beliefs
about religious supernaturalism was evident in Guiteau's higher law
defense.
After he was found guilty on January 25, 1881 (following a
rather short jury deliberation), Guiteau said about the jury which had
declared him guilty that they "did not pretend to be Christian men"
and therefore "did not appreciate the idea of inspiration." The jury
are "men of the world," Guiteau said, and "of moderate intelligence,"
and were therefore "not capable of appreciating the character of my
defense."23 But exactly the reverse may have been true. Perhaps
Guiteau had to be convicted because, in a culture which viewed itself
as part of Western Christendom, the theory which he offered to estab-
lish the insanity defense implicated biblical religion at exactly a time
when it was under heavy attack, facing challenges from several direc-
tions. For some, therefore, Guiteau's troublesome argument could
perhaps not simply be ignored or viewed as another symptom of
psycho-pathology. It had to be completely rejected.
I. BACKGROUND: CHRISTIANS AND THE CHRISTIAN NATION
"But what became of the prayers?" 24
Before reaching the substance of Guiteau's defense to the charge
of murdering James Garfield, it may be useful to consider the Chris-
tian background of Guiteau, and the jury. The idea of a Christian
Nation as described by Protestant spokesmen Samuel D. Spear and
Josiah Strong, as well as Justice David J. Brewer's 1905 discussion of
the question, helps to frame the argument which Guiteau was
making.
22. M. CURTI, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN THOUGHT 517 (3d ed. 1964). If supernatu-
ralism was "losing ground among intellectuals, it was by no means, in the post-Civil War
period, on the road to extinction among the masses." (Id at 519) without forcing the issue of
"the masses", one may note again the composition of the Guiteau jury.
23. Guiteau, Appeal to the American People, January 26, 1882 (quoted in ROSENBERG,
supra note 1, at 224).
24. The Independent, September 29 (1881).
187)
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At a certain level, at least, the issue of Guiteau as a Christian is
readily dealt with. Born in Illinois in 1841, Charles Guiteau was
raised in an intensely religious environment. His father was a spiri-
tual disciple of the Perfectionist leader John Humphrey Noyes.
Charles Guiteau himself lived at Oneida, the community which im-
plemented Noyes' controversial ideas relating to sexual and economic
arrangements, for a number of years. Guiteau considered himself
both a lawyer and a theologian, and wrote and lectured on religious
subjects. He was, as the free thinker Robert Ingersoll noted, "[a] fol-
lower of Moody and Sankey, and [he] was probably instrumental in
the saving of a great many souls." '26
The sense in which evangelical religion was among the most ba-
sic values of 19th century American life, the sense, in short, in which
America was a Christian Nation, is more difficult to address. Much
depends on the precise question being asked. For lawyers, the ques-
tion frequently comes up as part of a legal argument concerning the
constitutionality of a piece of state behavior. The result of the litiga-
tion will be yes or no; and lawyers, using the past as part of a legal
argument, will, thus, tend to present the historical record as unambig-
uous. For historians, the record seems more complex. The Federal
Constitution directed that there be no establishment of religion. The
states had disestablished their churches long before the civil war.
Nonetheless, Christian Nation rhetoric can be found in even official
materials. The question then becomes "to what degree a Christian
Nation?" or "in what way?" America may have been all too often a
Christian Nation from the point of view of a non-Christian immi-
grant,27 while it evidenced too much evil to be called a Christian Na-
tion from the point of view of professing Christians.28
One can explore the state of the Christian Nation question at the
time of the Guiteau Trial by bracketing the trial with two discussions
25. Professor Rosenberg provides this description of Luther Guiteau's beliefs. "By any
standards, his religious opinions were extreme--even in an age still harboring an abundance of
evangelical enthusiasm. The world was a very dramatic place to Luther Guiteau, one which
he viewed in essence as a stage for the confrontation of God and the Evil One; each soul, and
indeed every happening in the world, was an objective to be gained in this continuing struggle.
Selfish or sinful actions, he always explained, were a consequence of submission to the perva-
sive forces of Evil; benevolence came only through faith and submission to God. No action,
however small, could be ignored." Rosenberg, supra note I, at 14.
26. THE WORKS OF ROBERT INGERSOLL: INTERVIEWS 102 (1900). For a discussion of
Dwight L. Moody, see G. MARSDEN, FUNDAMENTALISM AND AMERICAN CULTURE 32-39
(1980).
27. M. BORDEN, JEWS, TURKS AND INFIDELS (1984).
28. See M. NOLL, THE SEARCH FOR CHRISTIAN AMERICA (1983).
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of the question by Protestant spokesmen. In 1876, Reverend Samuel
D. Spear, writing on the proposed Christian National amendment to
the Federal Constitution, attempted to discuss the ways in which the
country was and was not a Christian Nation.29 Spear noted that it
was clearly true that the American government was not Christian in
the sense intended by the proposed constitutional amendment. It was,
.however, "true that the Constitution establishes a 'Christian govern-
ment' in the sense of providing for those great moral ends that refer to
the present welfare and happiness of society."'30 Unity, common de-
fense, general welfare and the like are, he urged, surely "not anti-
Christian ends"; and, further, "it is not straining the import of the
term to say that they are Christian, considered with reference to the
department of Christianity which relates to the interests and duties of
time. ' 3 t He concluded that in this sense, the government of the
United States under the Constitution was already Christian. In an-
other discussion of the issue, he suggested that the country was a
Christian country in the sense that "Christianity is the religion which
has the greatest prevalence among the people, and exerts far the great-
est influence upon their thoughts, habits and usages, and in this way
reaches and affects the policy of the state in its legal operations."32
Ten years after Spear's treatment of the question, the Protestant
minister Josiah Strong's Our Country mirrored "the thoughts and as-
pirations of the dominant segment of American society towards the
close of the nineteenth century" toward America as a Christian Na-
tion.33 In Strong's book, in addition to the powerful Protestant vision
of the significance of America, one sees also the sense of crisis which
Protestant America felt. Strong opened his book with this observa-
tion: "There are certain great focal points of history toward which
the lines of past progress have converged, and from which have radi-
ated the molding influences of the future." These points included the
incarnation, the reformation, and "the closing years of the nineteenth
century, second in importance only to ... that only which must al-
29. S.D. SPEAR, RELIGION AND THE STATE OF THE BIBLE AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
213 (1876) ("Religious Amendment of the Constitution"). The amendment he was discussing
read: "We, the people of the United States, acknowledging Almighty God as the source of all
authority and lower in civil government, the Lord Jesus Christ as the ruler among the nations,
and his revealed will as of supreme authority, in order to constitute a Christian government, to
form a more perfect union.
30. Id. at 214.
31 Id.
32. Spear, p. 370. ("fragmentary Thoughts").
33. J. STRONG, OUR COUNTRY (1886 1891), at ix (1963) (introduction by Jurgen Herbst
ed.) (hereinafter Strong).
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ways remain first; viz the birth of Christ." 34
Strong's list of perils to the Christian nation included Romanism,
Mormonism, and particularly the problem of religion and the public
schools, the context for his discussion of the relation between church
and state. Quoting Story and Webster on Christianity and the general
law, he finds that while separation of church and state was mandated
in America, "there was no intent to separate the state from all religion
...." And as to the relationship between Christianity, the United
States, and millennial dream, Strong is very clear. "Notwithstanding
the great perils which threaten it, I cannot think our civilization will
perish: but I believe it is fully in the hands of the Christians of the
United States, during the next ten or fifteen years, to hasten or retard
the coming of Christian Kingdom in the world by hundreds and per-
haps thousands of years."' 3" Strong's book cannot simply be taken as
the representative statement of a small religiously oriented minority.
The book was a great commercial success. In its impact, it was com-
pared to Uncle Tom's Cabin.
For the purpose of this essay, the 1905 discussion of the Chris-
tian Nation question, by Supreme Court Justice David J. Brewer is
also useful if only to reinforce the point that the Christian Nation idea
had by no means disappeared by the end of the nineteenth century.
The United States was a Christian Nation, Brewer argued, though in
"a very special sense."'36 "This republic is classified among the Chris-
tian nations of the world," he said. "It was so formally declared by
the Supreme Court of the United States." In Holy Trinity Church v.
United States, "that Court, after mentioning various circumstances,
added, 'these and many other matters which might be noticed, add a
volume of unofficial declarations to the mass of organic utterances
that this is a Christian nation.' "37
"But in what sense can it be called a Christian nation?," Brewer
asked. "Not in the sense that Christianity is the established religion
or that the people are in any manner compelled to support it." In-
deed, the opposite was true, for the American Constitution specifi-
cally provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
Further, America was not a Christian Nation "in the sense that all its
citizens are either in fact or name Christians." Again, the opposite
34. Id. at 13 (emphasis in original).
35. Id. at 218.
36. D. BREWER, THE UNITED STATES: A CHRISTIAN NATION 12 (1905).
37. Id. at 11.
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was the case: "(a)ll religions have free scope within our borders.
Numbers of our people profess other religions, and many reject all."
And finally, this was not a Christian Nation in the sense that a profes-
sion of Christianity is a condition of holding office or otherwise engag-
ing in the public service, or essential to recognition either politically
or socially." For in America "the government as a legal organization
is independent of all religions." Nevertheless, Justice Brewer said,
"we constantly speak of this republic as a Christian nation-in fact, as
the leading Christian nation of the world. This popular use of the
term certainly has significance.
'38
Initially then, while the Christian amendment to the Constitu-
tion was never adopted,39 we should be clear that the Christian per-
spectives so evident in the first half of the nineteenth century were still
strong at the end of the century. 4° At the trial, one threat to these
conventional religious ideas was presented in the testimony of agnos-
tic psychiatrists' urging Guiteau's insanity.4 Another threat to or-
thodoxy was evident in Guiteau's antinomianism; and his "higher
law" defense42 that continuing revelation was possible and real, and
38. Id. at 12.
39. On the Christian Amendment, see L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 241,
242 (1967); M. Borden, supra.
40. The old order was under attack. But this is quite different from saying that the old
order was dead. The tension is caught in an anecdote about President Grant:
While medical experts injected brandy into Grant's veins, Newman seized a bowl of water
and baptized the unconscious man according to the rites of the Methodist Church. As the
patient revived, the cleric exclaimed, "It is Providence!" "No," replied the scientist, "it was
the brandy!" W. HESSELTINE, ULYSES S. GRANT: POLITICIAN 452 (1953) [quoted in P.
CARTER, SPIRITUAL CRISIS OF THE GILDED AGE 85 (1971)].
The co-existence of older and newer ideas is evident in some comments of Guiteau him-
self. Guiteau invoked a decision of a New York court, saying that it "revolutionizes the old
rule," is a "grand step forward in the law of insanity," and is "worthy of this age of railroads,
electricity, and telephones." And then he said, "I have no hesitation in saying that is a special
Providence in my favor .... 2 Trial, supra note 1, at 2203.
41. See ROSENBERG, supra note I, at 166-69. Guiteau's argument on his own insanity
was, of course not the same as that of the defense psychiatrists. Rosenberg quotes a note from
Guiteau to his brother, saying that there should not be an attempt to prove actual insanity. "It
would disgust the court and the jury. Legal insanity is all I claim." ROSENBERG, supra note i,
at 87.
42. In a system in which there is a clear religious authority (which can then decide what is
and is not possible and therefore what is and is not delusion), religious insanity, while it may
exist, poses no intellectual difficulty. A consequence of systematic separation of church and
state is that while religious authorities still exist, they no longer operate directly in the public
sphere to define reality. On what basis then does the state-officially removed now from ques-
tions of religious doctrine--determine who is insane when a disease of the mind is evidenced
by religious delusions? It seems that the issue is sometimes dealt with by treating the problem
as one rather like the problem of judicial notice. The things of which judicial notice is taken
may be weights and measures or the existence of witches, or the possibility of communication
with the dead or of supernatural duress. All are based on conventional perceptions of reality.
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that such revelation, as divine inspiration, justified practices illegal
under the law of the state.
The period following the shooting of James Garfield in the
Washington train station resulted, according to some observers, in an
unusual feeling and tone in the United States. Americans had shared
not only the experience of mourning the death of President Garfield,
but also the weeks of uncertainty as to whether the President would
live or die. It was suggested that the time was flatly unprecedented in
that the world was, to some considerable degree, present in the sick
room for three months, watching the medical profession working to
save the President.43 The idea that the time had a special quality for
America is found in comments such as this one from Russell Conwell:
"The bond of a common grief united the people with each other,"
Conwell wrote, "and the sufferings of the afflicted President and his
wife at Washington lifted the American people into a purer
sphere ... "4
The sermon delivered by Rev. S.D. Power at the President's
church in Washington (eight weeks after the shooting and at a time
when there was some indication of an improvement in President Gar-
field's condition) suggests what is likely to have been the content of
many sermons. His prayer had been, "Lord, spare the President's
life."4 So too the minister James Hoyt: "In an age noted for the
'Decline of faith,'" Rev. James Hoyt observed, "the Nation had for
eleven weeks been literally on its knees before God in prayer for [Gar-
field's] recovery." 46
"The efficacy of prayer has been made a prominent subject of
thought during the past Summer," Washington's Reverend Byron
Sunderland noted,47 and Rev. Robert Collyer said-just before Presi-
dent Garfield's death-that if the President should die "there would
at once spring up a vast amount of prayer."'48 When the President
See Mayock v. Martin, 157 Conn. 56, 245 A.2d 574 (1968) (discussing false beliefs in relation
to self-mutiliation). Cf Origen, The Russian Skoptsi.
43. See, e.g., The Sermon of James S. Hoyt, Sept. 25, 1881 (hereinafter James Hoyt
Sermon).
44. R. CONWELL, LIFE, SPEECHES, AND PUBLIC SERVICE OF JAMES GARFIELD 352
(1881).
45. The New York Times, Aug. 29, 1881, at 8 col. 2.
46. James Hoyt Sermon, supra note 43.
47. See B. SUNDERLAND, THE PROBLEM OF PRAYER AND THE DEATH OF PRESIDENT
GARFIELD, A DISCOURSE 3 (1881). Sunderland was, as far as he knew "the only minister who
saw and spoke with [the President] after he was shot." Id. Many sermons addressed the
religious meaning of the tragedy. For a summary of the responses of the clergy, see ROSEN-
BERG, supra note 1, at 7-8.
48. Collyer, quoted in The New York Times, Sept. 18, 1881, at 7 col. 4.
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died in September it seemed that the prayers had been futile. Even
the New York Times addressed the issue of disappointed faith:
"Much of the hope which has sustained the people during these weeks
of painful suspense," The Times said, "has been due to a certain faith
that what seemed to them in every way best for the Nation would
somehow be brought about."4 9 The result was different than they had
prayed for. "[1]n spite of hopes and fears and the fervent prayers that
have risen from so many altars and hearthstones," The Times contin-
ued, "the Power that doeth all things well has laid this great disap-
pointment upon the people. If it is a trial of their faith, it is a severe
one, but there is nothing in it to weaken their confidence that after all
the Nation is in the keeping of a higher power. '
Thus, it was to a nation which included many who were con-
cerned generally about science and religion and about the failure of
their prayers that Guiteau addressed his defense.
Specifically, of course, Guiteau addressed his argument to a
jury. 1 While we cannot know about the thought processes of the jury
as they listened to the evidence in the Guiteau trial, or what they
thought when they came to their decision, we can know something
about the orientations, and particularly religious orientations which
they brought to the trial.
Here, then, is a summary of the religious beliefs of the jury as
given in their responses to the attorneys questioning them to establish
their suitability as jurors: John P. Hamlin, in the restaurant business,
had not been a member of any church since "quite a young man."
When asked if he believed in any of the ordinary usual Christian dog-
mas or tenets he said, "I did when I attended them, but I have not
attended them lately. I was baptized in the Presbyterian Church. '5 2
49. The New York Times, Sept. 20, 1881, at I col. 2.
50. Id.
51. As already noted, the jurors chosen said they did not hold infidel views. Guiteau had
been, of course, interested in the selection of the jury. Professor Rosenberg notes that among
Guiteau's proposed questions of prospective jurors (part of a list which he gave to his brother-
in-law, Scoville, who was then defending him), were the following: "Do you believe in the
Bible? Do you believe in the letter of the Bible or simply its spirit? Are you now or have you
ever been a Christian? Do you believe in the inspiration of Paul and the Evangelists?"
Guiteau urged Scoville to pursue the religious convictions of the prospective jurors, to ask
whether they believed in the story of creation, Noah and the flood, Abraham and Isaac, the
children and the fiery furnace. Rosenberg supra note 1, at 114-15. Scoville asked generally
about infidelity, future rewards and punishments and church memberships. I Trial, supra note
1, at 23, 31,75.
52. 1 Trial, supra note I, at 29.
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The cigar manufacturer Frederick Brandenberg was a member of
the Lutheran Church. He said: "Yes, I think so" when asked if he
believed in religious tenets." Henry Bright, retired, was not an infidel
and believed "In Christ and Him crucified." When asked: "You do
not believe that this world is the end of all this and that people come
by chance and go by chance, do you?" He said "No." 4 Charles
Stewart, who was a dealer in flour and feed, was a church member."
The grocer Thomas Langley was a church member, and had been
one for forty years. 6 Michael Shehan, a grocer, a native of Ireland
and a naturalized citizen, was a church member. 7 S.F. Hobbs, a plas-
terer, was a church member.5 George Gates, a machinist, was not a
member of a church but said that he believed in the doctrines of the
Christian religion and was not an infidel. 9 Ralph Wormley, a plas-
terer, was first not "exactly" a church member, and then never was a
church member, but he believed in the hereafter and in heaven and
hell.60 William Brawner, a merchant (grocery and commission busi-
ness) was not a church member. He believed in rewards and punish-
ments.6 Thomas Heimeline, mechanic, believed in a Supreme
being.62 Joseph Peather, commission merchant, called himself a
Christian.63 When asked, these men said that they were not spiritual-
ists or infidels. They, finally, would judge the issues involved in
Guiteau's argument.
II. GUITEAU'S DEFENSE
Q. [The defense is] that you are legally insane, and not in
fact insane, is it?
A. The defense is, sir, that it was the Deity's act and not
mine, and He will take care of it.
Q. Are you insane at all?-
A. A great many people think I am very badly insane. ...
Q. You told the jury you were not insane.
A. I am not an expert. Let the experts and the jury decide
53. Id. at 31.
54. Id. at 35.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 37.
57. Id. at 53.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 66.
60. Id. at 75.
61. Id. at 83.




whether I am insane or not; that is what they are here for.
[Guiteau Trial]"
We are left with words on the page to evoke the atmosphere of
the Guiteau trial, and like any text, the Guiteau trial may mean differ-
ent things to different readers. The emphasis, tempo, inflection, may
all be varied to provide different readings,65 and Guiteau's remarks
may be seen as symptoms or as argument.66 They are taken here as
argument. Guiteau appeared at his trial in the role of additional and
informal counsel and for a good part of the trial sat at the counsel
table. His ideas are thus to be found not only in his formal testimony,
but also in his regular interruptions of the proceedings and his com-
ments at the opening of the session each day.
The question of whether Guiteau should have been allowed to
speak at all, and whether he was in fact aided by his participation, was
the subject of considerable contemporary discussion. The neurologist
Dr. George Beard suggested that if Guiteau had kept quiet in court atleast "some of the jury might have brought in a verdict in accordance
with the evidence" that he was insane.67 But Judge Walter Cox68 con-
cluded very early that it was best that Guiteau not be silenced. As it
was, a writer evaluating the trial in 1904 would see the event, widely
viewed as an embarrassment at the time, as one of which the nation
could be proud. The trial of Guiteau for the assassination of Garfield,
E. Hilton Jackson remarked with some satisfaction, "furnishes a re-
markable illustration of the genius and spirit of our Government."69
Guiteau was "without friends and without money." Still, he was "de-
fended by eminent counsel, demanding the full protection of the law
and of every guarantee of the Constitution, [and] was accorded every
right that could be extended to the most distinguished defendant."7
Medical commentators on the trial found Guiteau's behavior in-
64. Id. at 691.
65. The text in itself is largely bare though occasionally we see an explicit stage direction.
For example, at times the trial record notes that the prisoner spoke "[e]xcitedly," Id. at 136; or
that the judge spoke "solemnly," Id. at 2420.
66. Cf. R.D. LAING, THE DIVIDED SELF 29-31 (1969) (discussing E. Kraepelin's inter-
view with a patient).
67. Beard, The Case of Guiteau-A Psychological Study, 9 J. OF NERVOUS AND MENTAL
DISEASE 1, 24 (1882).
68. Judge Walter Cox, born in 1826, practiced law until 1879 when he was appointed to
the Supreme Court of Washington, D.C. In the course of his career he taught law at Columbia
University (Washington) and published Lessons in Law for Women (1900). as well as a discus-
sion on efforts to obtain a code of law for the District of Columbia, D.C. He died in 1902 in
Washington. [See I WHO WAS WHO IN AMERICA 1897-1942 (1966)].
69. Jackson, The Trial of Guiteau, 9 VA. LAW REV. 1023, 1023 (1904).
70. Id.
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dicative either of the man's character or of his insanity. Thus, Dr.
Charles Folsom, of Boston's McLean's Asylum and Harvard, wrote
in the American Law Review that "lilt is evident to one watching the
trial that Guiteau is either absorbed in the self-satisfied notoriety for
which he has yearned all his life, or that in his insanity he entirely
fails to appreciate the real gravity of his case." 7' 1 Dr. Folsom noted
that Guiteau's "witty remarks, .... impertinent jibes," "ready rejoin-
ders," "quick perception of points," "extraordinary memory," "irre-
pressible gabbing," and "fearless, reckless behavior," suggested either
"his intent on having as much fun as possible before his death, or his
irresponsibility." 72 As Dr. Folsom saw it, Guiteau had "constantly
injured his own case, by accusing his brother of being a defaulter in
open court; by calling his own witnesses liars; by asking for money for
his defense from those who gave to the fund for the widow whose
husband he assassinated; and by going off into all sorts of rambling
advice to the government to suppress Mormonism, or to President
Arthur to appoint or remove this or that officer, on the ground that he
can properly direct the man whom he made President."73 It was clear
to Dr. Folsom that a sane man, on trial for his life, would hardly have
been so heedless of his real position.
The English alienist, Dr. William Ireland, suggested that
Guiteau's comments "showed the odious features of Guiteau's char-
acter, his monstrous egotism, his misplaced vanity, his petulance and
ingratitude." "The prisoner said he was confident that the Deity
would take care of him," Ireland wrote of Guiteau some years after
the trial. "He kept up a desultory series of remarks and comments
upon what was said in, and sometimes out of, Court." While
Guiteau's interventions sometimes showed a shrewd view of the bear-
ings of the case in point, and great readiness of retort, Dr. Ireland
conceded, "at other times they seemed but the expression of wounded
vanity and blind anger."'74
The trial of Guiteau was strikingly theatrical and immensely in-
teresting to the public. Because Charles Guiteau considered himself
to be in the counsel role, the defense of the assassin was, as Professor
Rosenberg noted in his study of the Guiteau trial, "conducted on two
levels, one peculiar to Guiteau, the other corresponding to the percep-
tions of the other participants." It was, Professor Rosenberg writes,
71. Folsom, The Responsibility of Guiteau, 16 AM. L. REV. 85, 77 (1882).
72. Id. at 97.
73. Id.
74. Ireland, supra note 13, at 188.
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the "intricate interweaving of these two aspects," the combination of
the "delusional and real," which tended to produce the "quality of
pathetic grotesquerie ' 75 which marked the trial.
There were, certainly, two different insanity defenses offered.
George Scoville, Guiteau's brother-in-law and counsel, argued the
traditional insanity defense, often stressing hereditary insanity.
Guiteau's defense had a different thrust. He claimed his insanity was
"Abrahamic insanity," for which he should be acquitted. "The prose-
cution," Guiteau said to the jury,
pretend I am a wicked man. Mr. Scoville and Mr. Reed say I am a
lunatic. I certainly was a lunatic on July 2 when I fired on the
President, and the American people generally think I was, and I
presume you think I was .... You must say by your verdict sane
or insane at the moment I fired that shot. If you have any doubt of
my sanity at that moment you must give me the benefit of the
doubt and acquit, i.e., if you have any doubt whether I fired that
shot on my own account, or as the agent of the Deity. If I fired
[the shot] on my own account I was sane. If I fired it, supposing
myself the agent of the Deity I was insane, and you must ac-
quit .... Why did He inspire me in preference to some one else?
Because I had the brains and nerve, probably, to do the work. The
Lord does not employ incompetent persons to serve Him. He uses
the best material He can find. This pressure destroyed my free
agency. The Deity compelled me to do the act, just as a highway-
man compels a man to give him money, after placing a pistol at his
victim's head. The victim may know it is absolutely wrong for him
to give money that his wife and child need, but how can he keep it
with a pistol at his head? His free agency is destroyed and he gives
his money to save his life ... In shooting the President I deny that
I violated any law, human or divine. Nothing that the Deity di-
rects a man to do can violate any law.76
Guiteau ended on the following note:
I beg, for your own sakes, and for the sake of the American people,
and for the sake of generations yet unborn, that you let this case
alone. You cannot afford to touch it. Let your verdict be that it
was the Deity's act, not mine. When the President was shot his
Cabinet telegraphed to foreign nations that it was the act of a
"madman," and it will be far better every way that it be officially
75. ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 85.
76. 2 Trial, supra note 1, at 2202-05.
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decided that it was the act of a "madman." 77
Guiteau's speech to the jury marked by intensity and at one point
by crying,"' was not, on the whole, well received by the public. "Sat-
urday the assassin addressed the jury in his own behalf" The Chris-
tian Advocate reported, "reading his speech as published in the
newspapers last Monday, his egotism having prompted him to furnish
it for publication in advance. In a declamatory manner he rolled
forth his sentences, holding the paper with one hand and with the
other gesticulating and emphasizing his utterances." Guiteau's
speech was a "rambling, illogical affair," the paper said, "abounding
in declarations that he was insane when he shot the President, but
sane before and since. Of legitimate argument the speech was entirely
wanting. Its delivery will scarcely aid him in his desperate fight for
life." '79 Judge Cox himself at one point in the trial characterized
Guiteau's declarations as "lawless babble," 0 and it is possible to see
the closing speech as nothing more than this.
Yet surely it is also possible to see the argument in the speech, as
suggested by the quotation marks around the word "madman." The
issue for Guiteau was simple: God was beyond doubt responsible for
the death of Garfield. A ram had been sent once, but not this time.
Thus, when Guiteau was asked by J.M. Buckley of The Christian Ad-
vocate, "What would have been your view of God's relation to the
tragedy if President Garfield had got well?" Guiteau answered:
"Why, of course, I should have thought that God had countermanded
the order. That is what he did in Abraham's case, and Jonah's; he
said that Nineveh was to be destroyed, but it was not." Since "the
whole American people were praying for their president," Guiteau
said, "[there were] millions of prayers, all the Churches and people-
and if he had got well, I should have said that God countermanded
the order in answer to all those prayers.""
Thus Guiteau's invocation of the insanity defense was deliberate,
77. Id. at 2226. Guiteau's remarks to the jury were delivered at some length. He thought
of the speech as an oration comparable to those of Cicero.
There had been some discussion at the trial about whether the defendant should be per-
mitted to address the jury, but finally permission was granted, in part on the theory that it was
only proper that a man on trial should be allowed to address the jury which would decide the
question.
78. Id. at 2224.
79. Christian Advocate, Jan. 26, 1882.
80. 2 Trial, supra note I at 2331 (commenting particularly on Guiteau's repeated claim
that public opinion was in his favor).
81. Buckley, A Study of Guiteau, CHRISTIAN ADVOCATE, January 12, 1882, at 18.
Guiteau made the same point at the trial. I Trial, supra note i, at 1094.
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and at least to a point, manipulative, 2 a plea of insanity made in or-
der to achieve a legal result. In this respect, Guiteau seemed unlike
those who denied their own insanity and even refused to plead in-
82. Not only was Guiteau informed of the details of the insanity defense, but there was
evidence that Guiteau's information extended to the possibility of ultimate release following an
official inquiry on his sanity ("Sensation"). 2 Trial, supra note 1, at 1427. Thus it was thought
by some, including psychiatrist John Gray, that Guiteau was acting a role. One must note
however that this acting, if it was that, did not extend to any claim of an immediate or direct
sensory experience.
John Gray, head of the Insane Asylum at Utica, New York, was the major voice of the
American Journal of Insanity, a journal formally edited by the "medical officers of the New
York State Lunatic Asylum" at Utica. [On Gray, see Waldinger, Sleep of Reason: John P
Gray and the Challenge of Moral Insanity, 34 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF MEDICINE AND
ALLIED SCIENCES 163 (1979)]; for Gray on Guiteau, see below infra note. See also E.
DWYER, HOMES FOR THE MAD (1987).
Gray's view of the "Abrahamic insanity" argument is suggested by his comment on the
testimony of another psychiatrist: "The parallels attempted to be set up by counsel for the
defense as to the case of Abraham are altogether aside from any modern transaction; for the
whole ancient record must be taken into account and its authenticity granted. The history is
one of supernatural interference and visibly so; and therefore furnishes no warrant for any
modern parallel." Gray, The Guiteau Trial, supra note 1, at 361 (commenting on testimony 2
Trial, supra note 1, at 1337).
See also ROSENBERG, supra note 1; GROB, MENTAL ILLNESS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY,
1875-1940 (1983); N. DAIN, CONCEPTs OF INSANITY IN THE UNITED STATES 1789-1825
(1964).
Guiteau argued both his belief in his inspiration and the truth of his inspiration Gray
quoted Guiteau as follows: ". , . if I could establish the fact before a jury that I believed the
killing was an inspired act, I could not be held responsible before the law." (He paused a
moment, and then added): "You may add this, that the responsibility lies on the Deity, and
not on me, and that in law, is insanity." 1 Trial, supra note 1, at 12. When Guiteau was cross-
examined by Prosecutor Judge John Porter he insisted that the job of the jury was "to decide
whether the Deity fired that shot or whether I did it of my own personal act." Id. at 623. The
insanity defense is not prominent in this exchange, which states the issue as one of -human
versus divine action and responsibility. That, Guiteau is saying, is the issue to be decided.
Sometimes, however, "belief" as insanity does stand alone as an issue, as when Judge Porter
said that the case came down to the question whether the assassin "believed that he was com-
manded by God to murder the President" and Guiteau agreed that was "all there is to it." See
also 2 Trial, supra note 1, at 1321. A doctor testified that he had some cases involving people
who had "attempted murder under the insane delusion that they had instructions from the
Lord." Guiteau responded ("sneeringly"): "You know whether I had, don't you?" Was
Guiteau referring to the delusions? The instructions?
One can, of course, read these comments as nothing more than Guiteau's deliberate at-
tempt at his trial to convince the jury that he believed in the fact of his own inspiration,
perhaps as evidence of his own continuing insanity (despite his usual claim that he was sane at
his trial). But this seems to read out the "as ifs" in the argument on his insanity at the time of
the assassination. And why, if he was sanely manipulative of the insanity defense, did he fail to
claim to hear voices? This, as much of any problem relating to the timing of the inspiration
(see Gaylord, 36), would seem to have been a strategic miscalculation. In his preliminary
report on Guiteau's sanity (to determine whether Guiteau should stand trial or be sent to a
hospital) psychiatrist John Gray quoted Guiteau as saying that "if the jury accepts this [inspi-
ration] as my belief, and if the jury believes as I believe, that the removal of the President was
an inspired act and therefore not my own act, they are bound to acquit me on the ground of
insanity. I have looked over the field carefully." 1 Trial, supra note 1, at 12 (opinion of John
Gray).
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sanity. 3 But it is clear that while Guiteau asserted his legal insanity,
he denied his actual insanity. Moreover, the "as if insane" argument
Guiteau offered, far from being incoherent, resonated in the culture to
which it was addressed and was offered in a language entirely familiar
to his audience. The jury knew what it meant for Guiteau to say that
he was like Abraham and must have understood that Guiteau's de-
fense often involved the idea that the jury should accept not only his
belief in a divine command but the fact itself. "There are two kinds of
insanity," Guiteau said, "Cranky insanity and Abraham's style of in-
sanity. I belong to Abraham's style of insanity." He challenged an
expert witness: "What do you think about Abraham, doctor? He is
my example. That is the school I belong to."'84
Guiteau's was the language his audience had been taught as chil-
dren. James Bryce, in The American Commonwealth (1889) wrote
A great deal of the ordinary reading of the average family has a
religious tinge, being supplied in religious or semi-religious weekly
and monthly magazines. In many parts of the West, the old
problems of predestination, reprobation, and election continue to
be discussed by farmers and shopkeepers in their leisure moments
with the old eagerness, and give a somber tinge to their views of
religion. The ordinary man knows the Bible better, and takes up
an allusion to it more quickly than the ordinary Englishman,
though perhaps not better than the ordinary Scotchman."85
The "Ordinary Man" may or may not have been to school. But
those who did get to school often went to schools which reinforced a
Christian heritage. Loosely speaking, school books used in the first
half of the nineteenth century formed the background of thinking and
development of children who were adults in the second half of the
nineteenth century. Professor Ruth Miller Elson's study of 19th cen-
tury American school books notes that "school books before the Civil
War accept without question the Biblical history of the world and the
creation of man. The Garden of Eden and its inhabitants are as real
83. See discussion of Freeman, infra, text accompanying notes 115-150.
84. 2 Trial, supra note I, at 1415. Guiteau often asked the experts to deal with Abraham.
Seeid. at 1415, 1416, 1418, 1429, 1439, 1452, 1467, 1483, 1537, 1617, 1633, 1641, 1643, 1922,
2137. One expert testified that Abraham was not insane because there was no disease of the
mind. Id. at 1340. Scoville said at one point that he "did not care to try Abraham," id. at
1343. The possibility of the insanity of the Apostles was also discussed. Id. at 1345.
85. J. BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 573 (1889). Professor George Marsden
notes that "[t]he Bible, it was constantly asserted, was the highest and all-sufficient source of
authority." G.M. MARSDEN, FUNDAMENTALISM AND AMERICAN CULTURE: THE SHAPING
OF THE 20TH CENTURY EVANGELICALISM 1870-1925 16 (1980).
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as the Appalachians." 6 Professor Elson noted that "Innumerable in-
stances of God's direct interposition in favor of the American people
are given to support the idea that Americans are the people chosen by
God in the modern world for a special destiny." For example, she
writes that, in the textbooks, "Columbus is guided by God through
great difficulties; His intervention is not by inspiration but by mira-
cles." And again, the coming of the Pilgrims was "ordained by Provi-
dence to reform the world."'87 Similar illustrations "appear in almost
every school book."88
Even if the Bible was no longer quite as central to America in the
1880's as it had been earlier, 9 it nonetheless provided a pervasive
background, accepted or rejected, against which things could be seen
and understood. But through the 19th century, the problem of how
one approached the Bible was a matter for debate within Christianity.
Genesis 22, for example, could be viewed as literally true and centrally
relevant to the Christian tradition. Here we have a treatment of
Abraham by Bishop Huntington of New York: When God told
Abraham that he would have a child, Bishop Huntington said, "no
stupid rationalism in him rose up to doubt the glorious word."
"When God suddenly required him to take that dearly-loved boy
around whose fair head such marvelous hopes had already begun to
cluster, and make him ready for a sacrifice, the good man lifted up the
burden of this awful sorrow, went to the mount, laid the wood in
order, built the altar, and then answered to the child's unsuspecting
question, 'Where is the victim?' God, my son, will prepare Himself a
burnt-offering .... "90 The conclusion relates this story, in a manner
common for many centuries, to the central Christian narrative. "So,
in the eternal purpose of the Spirit, the complete succession of Scrip-
tural events is one plan; the Revelation of Christ, the crucified Re-
deemer and everlasting Life, is the center and heart of the entire body
86. R. ELSON, GUARDIANS OF TRADITION: AMERICAN SCHOOLBOOKS OF THE NINE-
TEENTH CENTURY 17 (1964). On late 19th century education, see M. KELLER, AFFAIRS OF
STATE: PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (1977).
87. Elson, supra note 86, at 60.
88. Id. at 61.
89. See THE BIBLE IN AMERICA: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL HISTORY (N. Hatch & M. Noll
eds. 1982).
90. F. HUNTINGTON, CHRIST IN THE CHRISTIAN YEAR IN THE LIFE OF MAN: SERMONS
FOR LAYMAN'S READING, TRINITY TO ADVENT 70-71 (1881) (Episcopal Bishop of Central
New York). For Huntington on the labor question, see the extract published in I A DOCU-
MENTARY HISTORY OF RELIGION IN AMERICA SINCE 1865 115 (Gausted ed. 1983). See also
HOPKINS, THE RISE OF THE SOCIAL GOSPEL IN AMERICAN PROTESTANTISM 83, 89, 151
(1982).
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of the Bible making it one organized whole. And so even in believing
Abraham we behold the victory which overcometh the world, even a
Christlike faith." 91
But this view of Abraham was not the only one possible: indeed,
a leading liberal minister, Theodore Parker, had used the story of
Abraham decades earlier as one example of a point at which the Old
Testament could simply not be viewed as literally true. Protesting the
intellectual climate of his time, Parker wrote that "Matters have come
to such a pass," that he is considered "an infidel, if not by implication
an atheist, whose reverence for the Most high forbids him to believe
that God commanded Abraham to sacrifice his Son." This was,
Parker wrote, "a thought at which the flesh creeps with horror; to
believe it solely on the authority of an oriental story, written down
nobody knows when or by whom, or for what purpose; which may be
a poem but cannot be the record of a fact, unless God is the author of
confusion and a lie." 92 Thus to say "like Abraham" meant different
things to different people, even when not used as a justification for the
assassination of the President. It will be urged below (Section III)
that those different approaches to the biblical story itself are visible in
the responses offered in the general culture to individuals who in-
voked Abraham in justification of their own criminal behavior.
Before reaching that issue, however, it is appropriate to consider the
response of the legal system to the claim.
III. RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND INSANE DELUSIONS
It is not an opinion which I mean to lay down as a rule of law to be
applied in all cases, that fanaticism is a proof of unsoundness of
mind, but there was in this particular instance, so much religious
fanaticism, such great absurdity and extreme folly, that if [the de-
ceased] was now on his trial, it could hardly be said from the evi-
dence, that he could be called in to answer for his criminal acts.
Lord Denman, CJ93
Guiteau's argument raised in an extreme form a large issue of the
relationship between religiously motivated behavior and the rules of
the legal system. This first argument-which strikes, in effect, above
91. Huntington, supra note 90, at 71. For an introduction to typology, see P. Sheingorn
"Typology and the Teaching of Medieval Drama" in APPROACHES TO TEACHING OF MEDIE-
VAL ENGLISH DRAMA (R. Emmerson, ed.) (M.L.A. forthcoming).
92. Parker, The Transient and Permanent in Christianity, [1841] in THREE PROPHETS OF
LIBERALISM: CHANNING-EMERSON-PARKER 113, 126 (1964).
93. R. v. Tyler & Price, 8 Car & P.616 (1838).
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the legal system-was that he had in fact been divinely commanded to
kill the President and that this command served as a legal excuse,
since the "higher law" must control. 94 As to this, one must stress the
obvious. The center of the Guiteau trial is the certainty of his audi-
ence that there had been in fact no divine command to Guiteau to kill
the president. 95 Far from saying that the truth of the divine com-
mand to Guiteau, at least, was unknowable, the discussion at the
Guiteau trial proceeds on the assumption that the truth was entirely
known. Thus, at one point Mr. Reed, defending Guiteau, said that
"[n]obody claims that he was inspired to do it. Nobody pretends it.
It would have been monstrous to pretend it." 96 Only Guiteau himself,
Reed said, thought that he had been inspired. And again, "not that
he was inspired or that God did it, by no means; but the evidence of
insanity is the belief that God inspired him to do it. That proves his
insanity." 97 A witness was asked by defense counsel Scoville, "Do
you believe at all in the Deity's inspiring people to do acts at the pres-
ent day?," and he answered, "not of that character." The audience
applauded. 98 Because of this certainty, it was not necessary to reach
either the question of the effect that such a command, if given in fact,
might have on the general legal rule, or the question of how one could
94. But perhaps the higher law is that the human law controls. The point that the rela-
tionship between higher law and human law is not simple is suggested with notable economy in
Melville's comparison between Captain Vere and Abraham in BILLY BUDD (Chapter 22). See
also J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND at 160 n. I (1883): "If a
special Divine order were given to a man to commit murder, I should certainly hang him for it
unless I got a special Divine order not to hang him." (And would he then still be functioning
as a judge?).
For discussions of problems relating to divine command, see J. IDZIAK, DIVINE COM-
MAND MORALITY: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS (1979); P. QUINN, DIVINE
COMMANDS AND MORAL REQUIREMENTS (1978); DIVINE COMMANDS AND MORALITY (P.
Helm, ed. 1981).
95. Persons claiming direct revelation were, and much earlier than the nineteenth cen-
tury, viewed with distinct suspicion. As to the historical evolution of the revelation issue,
Keith Thomas writes: "In the later seventeenth century it became orthodox to declare that the
gift of prophecy had ceased .... The change may be best expressed by saying that in the
sixteenth century the claims of a would-be prophet would always be seriously investigated,
even if ultimately exposed as groundless, but by the eighteenth century the majority of edu-
cated men concurred in dismissing them a priori as inherently ridiculous." K. THOMAS, RELI-
GION AND THE DECLINE OF MAGIC 145-46 (1971). James Moorhead has observed that "by
the late nineteenth century [evangelical] picty was waning" and that this change was symbol-
ized by a deemphasis on the sudden dramatic conversion experience. "Distrustful of sharp
discontinuities in the spiritual life, many Protestants preferred to speak of continuous matura-
tion and of the natural unfolding of religious experience." Moorhead, The Erosion of Post
Millenialism in American Religious Thought 1865-1925, 53(l) CHURCH HISTORY 61, 68-69
(1984).
96. 2 Trial, supra note 1, at 1979.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1337.
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determine whether such a command had been given to Guiteau or
anyone, now or ever.
The consensus reflected in trial as to this fundamental issue of
the fact of the command99 meant that the problem could become
whether Guiteau's belief in this delusion-if he believed in it at all-
would be classified as a delusion which excused criminal behavior.
The positive law on religion and the insanity defense can be quickly
stated. If the defendant's religious belief were to be classified as an
"insane delusion," he might be protected by the insanity defense.1°°
Divine command was well known as an example of such a delusion.
If on the other hand the belief was not classified as insanity, it would
be seen merely as extreme religious belief. A few years before the
Guiteau trial such extreme religious belief had come before the
Supreme Court of the United States in a case involving Mormon po-
lygamy.' 0' In January, 1879, the United States Supreme Court deliv-
ered its opinion in Reynolds v. United States, a case dealing with the
prosecution of a Mormon polygamist under the 1862 federal anti-big-
amy statute. A standard citation in the field of church and state,
Reynolds upheld the conviction and rejected a first amendment free
exercise defense. In Reynolds, the jury had been instructed that:
99. Other parts of the law might also reveal doctrinal civil religion. Simon Greenleaf's
nineteenth century treatise on Evidence contains a telling discussion of the incompetency as
witnesses of those who are "insensible to the obligations of an oath, from a defect of religious
sentiment and belief." American law, he writes, "presumes that every man brought up in a
Christian land, where God is generally acknowledged, does believe in Him and fear Him. S.
GREENLEAF, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, Part III Sec 368, 370.
See R. BELLAH, THE BROKEN COVENANT: "It is one of the oldest of sociological gener-
alizations that any coherent and viable society rests on a common set of moral understandings
about good and bad, right and wrong, in the realm of individual and social action. It is almost
as widely held that these common moral understandings must also in turn rest upon a common
set of religious understandings that provide a picture of the universe in terms of which the
moral understandings make sense."
The issue of direct inspiration is evident in the case of Anne Hutchinson, see "The exami-
nation of Mrs. Anne Hutchinson" in THE ANTINOMIAN CONTROVERSY n.29 (Hall ed. 1968),
as well as that of the 19th century Mormons. See the Mormon letter quoted by William James
in VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 365 (1958). It may be noted that modern revelation
is one of the doctrines of Mormonism. See also Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term: Fore-
word: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARVARD L. REV. 4 (1983) (problem of new revelation in
systems based on revelation).
The positive law as it relates to divine command or any other explicitly religious issue
may simply be whatever the law wants it to be. See J. THAYER, LEGAL ESSAYS 325 (1927).
100. On the history of the insanity defense, see I N. WALKER, CRIME AND INSANITY IN
ENGLAND: THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1968). On the insanity defense in general, see A.
GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1967); H. FINGARETFE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL
INSANITY (1972). There is, of course, no attempt here to discuss the modern debate over
issues relating to excuse for criminal responsibility.
101. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
CHARLES GUITEAU
... if the defendant, under the influence of a religious belief that it
was right,-under an inspiration, if you please, that it was right,-
deliberately married a second time, having a first wife living, the
want of consciousness of evil intent, the want of understanding that
he was committing a crime, did not excuse him.' 02
Upholding the instruction, the Court by Chief Justice Morrison
Waite noted that: "[L]aws are made for the government of actions,
and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opin-
ions, they may with practices." Even if one "believed that human
sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship,: could it really be
argued that the state could not prevent this? Or, if a wife religiously
believed it was her duty to burn herself upon the funeral pyre of her
dead husband," he continued, "would it be beyond the power of the
civil government to prevent her carrying her belief into practice?" So,
here, Justice Waite concluded, where plural marriages are forbidden,
"can a man excuse his practice to the contrary because of his religious
belief?" The answer was clearly no, for "to permit this would be to
make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of
the land." In effect, this would "permit every citizen to become a law
unto himself," and then "Government could exist only in
name .... ",103
The principle of the Reynolds case is that religious belief provides
no excuse from the general law. There is no need under Reynolds, to
focus on issues of sincerity, since sincere or not, the belief could not
excuse. An essential legal idea in the Guiteau trial was that the rule
of Reynolds would govern Guiteau's act unless his religious "beliefs"
would be judged an "insane delusion."'"
The insanity defense assumes not only that the insane should not
be considered criminals, but also that one can know who the insane
are. 0 Nineteenth century America was aware of change on that is-
102. Id. at 162. John Locke in A Letter Concerning Toleration had made the fundamental
argument:
You will say by this rule, if some congregations should have a mind to sacrifice
infants, or (as the primitive Christians were falsely accused), lustfully pollute them-
selves in promiscuous uncleanliness, or practice any other such heinous enormities, is
the magistrate obliged to tolerate them because they are committed in a religious
assembly? I answer, no. These things are not lawful in the ordinary course of life,
nor in any private house; and therefore, neither are they so in the worship of God, or
in any religious meeting.
103. Id. at 166-167.
104. See arguments of the prosecution 2 Trial, supra note I at 1755, 1919, 1832.
105. "If sanity and insanity exist, how shall we know them? The question is neither capri-
cious nor itself insane. However, much we may be personally convinced that we can tell the
normal from the abnormal, the evidence is simply not compelling ... [n]otions of normality
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sue. "You know as a matter of history," a Pennsylvania court noted
in 1878, "that men were not insane in the old times without they were
madmen. A man was not considered insane if he knew what he was
doing. He must tear his clothes, do acts of violence-and continu-
ously do all of those things which indicated all the time that he was
crazy ... ."106
This extreme behavior was no longer required by law, though a
large question remained open as to what exactly was required.
The M'Naghten formula relates to the capacity to know right
and wrong, and it was this traditional formula which was used in
Guiteau's case. 107 Judge Cox's general instruction to the jury was to
the effect that a criminal is responsible if "he knew what he was doing
and knew that what he was doing was contrary to the law of the
Land." This was true unless the criminal "was laboring under such a
defect of reason as to be incapable of understanding the obligation of
the law of the Land and the duty and necessity of obedience to it, and
of understanding that his act was wrong because it was in violation of
the law of the Land."'" 8 Thus, Judge Cox told the jury that the test of
responsibility was "the question of knowledge of right and wrong as
and abnormality may not be quite as accurate as people believe they are." Rosenhan, On Being
Sane in Insane Places, 179 SCIENCE 250, 250 (1973).
It may be that there is a presumption of sanity which stands, whatever one's opinion or
mind-sets, until somehow brought into question. One might then ask: What triggers the legal
inquiry? And answer it: "a crime, an eccentric or anti-social act," "a will subject to chal-
lenge by a relative." It is only then and only reluctantly, that we are asked to consider
whether, for example, a belief in spiritualism makes one unfit to make a will. (See Field, Is
Beliefin Spiritualism Ever Evidence of Insanity per se?, VI 6 MEDICO-LEGAL J. 194 (1888).
106. Commonwealth v. Lynch, 25 PITr. L.J. 193, 194 (1878).
107. That is, though somewhat critical, Judge Cox used a general statement of the
M'Naghten rules. It was said that under the M'Naghten rules one deals with the delusion "as
if the fact with regard to which the delusion exists were true." (2 Trial, supra note 1, at 2336).
"This has been in part recognized as law in this country," said Judge Cox. He then quoted
Lemuel Shaw on the subject of monomania.
See also Commonwealth v. Rogers, 7 METCALF 500 502 (1844) (Shaw, L.J.). See the dis-
cussion of the Shaw opinion in DAVIS, HOMICIDE IN AMERICAN FICTION, 1798-1860 93
(1957).
This seems to treat the religious delusion (divine command) as one of fact. Cf ST. J.
ROBILLARD, RELIGION AND THE LAW 127 (1983) (suggesting that such a delusion is one of
"law" and is not a defense). See also G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: PART I 53 46, 98
(1953).
108. 2 Trial, supra note 1, at 2336. The Mormons, while not, of course, arguing the in-.
sanity defense, did urge that they lacked the requisite mental state for conviction of a crime.
See Brief for Plaintiffs In Error at 55-57, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (dis-
cussion of mens rea). See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
Judge Cox indicated that the jury could take into account the evidence of hereditary
insanity, Guiteau's past life, his behavior at Oneida, and all other facts introduced into evi-
dence which bore on Guiteau's mental state at the time of the crime. 2 Trial, supra note I at
2334.
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to the particular act, or rather the capacity to know it." The issue of
insane delusion is only important, Judge Cox said, as it throws light
upon the question of knowledge of, or capacity to know, right and
wrong.
Pursuing the matter of delusion, in his charge to the jury, Judge
Cox identified two types of belief, one of which would not involve
insanity while the other would. In the case of the first, a belief or
delusion based on reason and internal process, the rule would be that
of the Mormon polygamy case, Reynolds v. United States.1°9 The
Mormon prophets were not permitted to violate the law relating to
bigamy. In Reynolds v. United States, the "professed doctrines of reli-
gious belief" could not be allowed to be superior to the law of the
land. And here, though "a man might reason himself into a convic-
tion of the expediency and patriotic character of political assassina-
tion," one could not "allow him to find shelter from punishment
behind the belief, as an insane delusion."" If Guiteau's position
reduces itself to something like the idea that the death of the Presi-
dent is necessary to accomplish a good object, Judge Cox said, then it
is only "one of those vagaries of opinion for which the law has no
toleration and which furnishes no excuse whatever for crime." These
were sane beliefs."'
But there was another kind of belief which was an insane delu-
sion, Judge Cox said. This consisted of "a belief by a person that he is
inspired by the Almighty to do something; to kill another, for exam-
pie-and this delusion may be so strong as to impel him to the com-
mission of a crime." As to this type, "[t]he defendant, in this case,
claims that he labored under such a delusion and impulse, or pres-
sure, as he calls it, at the time of the assassination.""' 2
Judge Cox elaborated on the distinction between the two kinds of
delusion in the following way: "It is easy to understand that the con-
ceit of being inspired to do an act may be either a sane belief or an
insane delusion." In his discussion of sane beliefs, Judge Cox then
acknowledged religious convictions and commitments common in
American Christianity: "A great many Christians believe" he said
"not only that events generally are providentially ordered, but that
they themselves receive special providential guidance and illumina-
tion in reference to both their inward thoughts and outward actions
109. 98 U.S. 145.
110. 2 Trial, supra note 1, at 2340.
111. Id. at 2341.
112. Id.
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and, in an undefined sense, are inspired to pursue a certain course of
action." But this "undefined sense" of inspiration is a mere sane be-
lief, Judge Cox said "whether well or ill founded." As against this, "if
you were satisfied that a man sincerely though insanely, believed that,
like Saul of Tarsus, on his way to Damascus, he had been smitten to
the earth, had seen a great light shining around him, had heard a
voice from heaven, warning and commanding him, and that thence-
forth, in reversal of his whole previous moral bent and mental convic-
tions, he had acted upon this supposed revelation, you would have
before you a case of imaginary inspiration amounting to an insane
delusion."" '3
"[T]he insane delusion," Judge Cox explained, "seems to be an
unreasoning and incorrigible belief in the existence of facts which are
either impossible absolutely, or, at least, impossible under the circum-
stances of the individual." Thus, "A man, with no reason for it, be-
lieves that another is attempting his life, or that he himself is the
owner of untold wealth, or that he has invented something which will
revolutionize the world, or that he is President of the United States,
or that he is God or Christ, or that he is dead, or that he is immortal,
or that he has a glass arm, or that he is pursued by enemies, or that he
is inspired by God to do something." Judge Cox made plain that, as
he understood it, "the fact believed is something affecting the senses."
He stressed that "the important thing is that an insane delusion is
never the result of reasoning and reflection. It is not generated by
them, and it cannot be dispelled by them.""' 4 The responsibility of
the jury, said Judge Cox, was to find whether Guiteau's claim
presented anything like these descriptions of the insane delusion.'",
The distinction between a sane belief and an insane religious de-
lusion had been recently illustrated by the 1879 case of Charles Free-
man, "the modern Abraham."' 1 6 Freeman killed his young daughter
Edith, in May 1879, believing that this sacrifice had been divinely
commanded and that the child would rise on the third day." 7 Free-
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2337.
115. At least on the issue of auditory and visual hallucinations, it plainly did not. The
point here is that unlike Joan of Arc, Guiteau did not hear voices. Nor did he see visions. He
did not "get [his] inspirations in that way." I Trial, supra note 1, at 617.
Charles Freeman, by contrast, had visions (see supra notes 87-95 and accompanying text).
116. G. BEARD, THE CASE OF GUITEAU: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY 9 (1882).
117. The Pocasset Tragedy was reported in newspapers as far away as London. See, e.g.,
London Times, May 5, 1879, at 7 col. 6. After Freeman's acquittal in December, 1883, Dr.
Folsom published an article on the case, including a long excerpt from Freeman's testimony at
his trial. Folsom, The Case of Charles F Freeman of Pocasset, Mass. 40 AM. J. INSANITY 353-
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man had consulted his wife and after some deliberation had con-
cluded that this was a test, like the test of Abraham, recounted in
Chapter 22 of Genesis. Freeman was found insane on the basis of a
hearing held in 1879 and declared unfit for trial. He was in an institu-
tion at the time of the Guiteau trial."'
Freeman wanted a jury trial. "I could convince any jury that I
stand on the top of Mount Zion," he said, "that I hold the keys of
heaven, and that I was but obeying God's command." He felt that he
had done his duty. "I ought to obey God rather than man." Of
course, "we should abide by the common laws as a general rule, and it
is not in accordance with Christianity to break human laws." He
would, however, "qualify that by saying that God has special laws in
his plans." I19
Freeman believed that he acted on the evidence of his senses.
"Do you believe now that you acted in accordance with the law of
God?," he was asked. "Certainly I do," he said, "if I had not had so
much supernatural evidence I should not have been here."' 2 ° The
evidence which Freeman believed included visions. "Why," said he,
"it is just as I look at you now and think I see you. It may be an
optical illusion, but if I feel, smell and touch you, and you strike back,
I am convinced."'12' And finally Freeman rejected the ideal of his
own insanity. "What will become of my past life and teachings," he
said, "if I am adjudged insane? Let me go into court and preach."'' 22
Guiteau's brother-in-law Scoville, offering the argument for the
363 (1884). Materials relating to Freeman's release in 1887 can be found in the Massachusetts
State Archive. [Application for release of Charles F. Freeman from the Danvers Insane Hos-
pital, 16 March 1887. Files of the Governor's Council, Box 98 (Archives of the Common-
wealth, Boston, Massachusetts).]
118. Freemen was finally tried in 1883. Following his acquittal, Freeman, though then
sane, was hospitalized pursuant to the Massachusetts statute of 1873 which provided that a
prisoner should be kept in confinement "until it appears to the Governor and Council that he
may be discharged and set at large without danger to others." Under this statute there was no
issue of treatment and there could be no discharge simply on a finding of sanity. The acquitted
individual "is confined in the hospital as a place of detention, because his being at large would
be dangerous to the peace and safety of the community." Gleason v. Inhabitants of West
Bolyston, 136 Mass. 489, 490 (1884) (citing St. 1862, c. 223, § 17).
Freeman was perhaps thinking of Guiteau (in 1883) when he said "I never aspired to go
into politics or hold office and for that reason I do not think it can be said about me that I
wished to be a great man and gain notoriety." (quoted in Folsom supra n. 117 at 356). After
his release in 1887, it is reported that "Freeman went west to begin life anew." Barnstable,
Three Centuries of a Cape Cod Town 367 (D. Trayser, ed. 1939).
119. "A Religious Maniac," Boston Daily Advertiser, Jan. 30, 1880, at 1, col. 9.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. "The Pocasset Child-Murder," Boston Daily Advertiser, Jan. 29, 1880, at 1, col. 5.
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defense in his speech to the jury, reminded the jury of the legally rec--
ognized insane delusion of Charles Freeman. Discussing Guiteau's
inspiration and how it worked on Guiteau's mind, Scoville said,
What did he do? Consistent with his Christian character, with his
education, he prayed to the Lord. You may say, and gentlemen
have throughout, that the idea of a man having murder in his heart
and praying to the Lord is shocking. The act of an insane mind is
usually shocking to the sane mind. Is it more shocking than the
act of the mother who knelt in prayer with three children and then
killed them? Was it more shocking than the act of Freeman and
his wife, near Boston, who knelt in prayer and wrestled in prayer
with the Lord to know whether it was His will whether they
should kill their sleeping child, and rising from their knees the fa-
ther proceeded to drive the knife home to the heart of the little girl.
Was not that shocking? It would be in a sane person, but with
the insane it is different, gentlemen. 123
And Freeman seems to appear in Judge Cox's charge to the jury:
"Another man, whom you know to be an affectionate father, insists
that the Almighty has appeared to him and commanded him to sacri-
fice his child."' 24 This delusion, "which reason cannot touch," is
given as an example of the insane delusion which should result in
acquittal.
A number of doctors in their discussion of insanity, compared
Guiteau favorably and unfavorably with Freeman in assessing the va-
lidity of his insanity defense. 2 ' Dr. Folsom, who had participated in
the Freeman case insisted that Guiteau's arguments were simply a
"poor imitation of those features of the case of Freeman, the Pocasset
murderer." Writing in the American Law Review on the Guiteau
case, Folsom thought that "the theories of inspiration and impulse
were only after thoughts, or adopted as means to escape the gal-
lows. .. ."126 Dr. Godding, who discussed Guiteau's inspiration at
some length, recalled Freeman of Pocasset, "who prayed to God with
his wife, and pondered His Word," until Freeman had "an impression
in his mind, that he must offer up his daughter, that his faith might be
123. 2 Trial, supra note I, at 2121-22. See also I Trial supra note 1, at 1341.
124. Id. at 2337-38.
125. The Canadian insurgent Louis Riel (tried for treason and handed in 1885) was, in
turn, compared with Guiteau. See THE QUEEN v. Louis RIEL (with an introduction by
Desmond Morton) pp. xxix, xxx (1974). See also IRELAND, THROUGH THE IVORY GATE 229
(1889). I would like to thank Richard Kay for calling the Riel trial to my attention.
126. Folsom, The Responsibility of Guiteau, 16 AM. L. REV. 85, 95 (1882). Dr. Folsom
was convinced of Guiteau's insanity on other grounds, and was a witness for the defense, I
Trial, supra note 1, at 770.
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manifest to the world, believing that God was able to bring back life
to that cold clay on the third morning.' 1 27 Dr. Denny foundthat
"there was a similarity in the case of Guiteau and Freeman, in some
ways," particularly "the suddenness of conception" (or rather the
way they expressed. themselves about it); also "the way they had
struggled against the desire and the fixedness of the idea." And then
he added, "the deed itself showed insanity."'' 2 8
Other commentators on the Guiteau case also remembered Free-
man. The liberal clergyman, Moncure Conway, in his remarks on
Garfield's assassination and the influence of religion and others also
referred to the Pocasset case. Conway noted that, "[T]his is the sec-
ond time in the last few years, that America has been brought face to
face with some of the possible results of preserving the forms and
phrases of barbarian religion."' 29  The journalist Gail Hamilton
recalled Freeman, the man "who slew his own child, his helpless, in-
nocent, baby-daughter, in alleged obedience to voice from Heaven."
Religion, she said, "justly refused to be held responsible for his crime,
but she came a great deal nearer to the Pocasset murder than ever
came our civil service to the Washington assassination."' 30 And free
thinker Robert Ingersoll remembered Freeman as one who "imitated
Abraham; and, for that matter Jehovah himself." In the history of
Christianity, Ingersoll said, there are "thousands and thousands of
127. W. GODDING, Two HARD CASES: SKETCHES FROM A PHYSICIAN'S PORTFOLIO 177
(1882). Godding's views are summarized in ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 134-35. Godding
viewed Freeman as having merely "an impression" (as opposed to visions). Godding, supra at
177.
128. Reports of Societies, 107 BOSTON MEDICAL & SURGICAL J. (December 28, 1882).
129. M. CONWAY, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF GARFIELD: A DISCOURSE BEFORE THE
SOUTH PLACE RELIGIOUS SOCIETY 18 (1881).
130. Hamilton, The Things Which Remain, 135 NORTH AMERICAN REV. 76, 78 (July,
1882). Gail Hamilton, denying that the assassination was the fruit of the spoils system, raised
the possible responsibility of the family ("for Guiteau sprang, full-armed for vice, from the
bosom of a once responsible family") and religion ("for Guiteau was a Christian before he was
a politician and after he was an assassin"). Id. Essentially Hamilton argued that Guiteau was
not the fruit of any "political or religious or political system whatever." Hamilton, at 80. The
Freeman case raised familiar questions as to whether religion was a cause of insanity, and
familiar denials of the charge. When, as in Freeman's case, the insanity was associated with
murder, the relation of religion and insanity would be discussed with peculiar intensity. "The
Massachusetts tragedy of the Freemans has sent a thrill of horror through the land," one
journal commented, and, "as usual, some indignant writers have ascribed the murder of the
little child to the effects of religious fanaticism." There were others, "more precise, but equally
wrong-headed," who attributed the murder "to the peculiar tenets of the Second Adventists."
But both of these are unjust, the journal insisted. "There is no connection between religious
enthusiasm and infanticide. There is nothing in the belief that the day of the Lord's coming is
at hand, or even in the delusion that the time has been revealed in prophecy, to move parents
to kill their child." (The Churchman, May 24, 1879, at 562, col. 2-3.)
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such instances, and there will probably be many thousands more...
produced by throwing away our own reason and taking the word of
some one else--often a word that we do not understand."' 3 '
Finally, the law found Freeman insane. But there were also
those who thought that Freeman should be hanged for the murder of
his daughter. For some, Freeman was not a madman but only a fa-
natic, whose beliefs had led him to commit a terrible crime for which
he should be punished. "We see no sign of insanity," the Independent
said of Freeman in 1879. Rather, "[i]t was somehow impressed on
the man's mind that the sacrifice was needed. He somehow took it to
be the direction of God."' 32 There are, the Independent noted,
"Many men [who] think God 'directs' them to do what is only self-
evolved; but we do not call them crazy." Freeman was no more crazy
than another man who believes that God impresses it on his mind that
he should go or not go on a certain vessel. The only difference is that
this is an exceptional case of such impression, in which the horror of
it did not correct it."1 33
Viewed in this light the issue then became purely a matter for the
criminal law. "What then shall we do with murderous fanatics? Shall
a man who commits murder, or adultery, or robbery, supposing it to
be an injunction of God, be punished according to law?"'' 34 Clearly
yes, since the purpose of the criminal law is to "protect the rights of
the community." This was also true, the Independent noted, in "the
parallel case of the Mormon or the Oneida adulteries."' 3 s In all these
instances, "the punishment should be for the offense, without regard
131. THE WORKS OF ROBERT G. INGERSOLL 104 (Dresden ed. 1900).
132. The Pocasset Murder, The Independent, May 15, 1879.
133. Id.
134. Id. The Independent suggested that after the sentence, Freeman might be imprisoned
for life instead of being hanged.
135. Id. On Oneida see C. WEISBROD, THE BOUNDARIES OF UTOPIA (1980); Weisbrod,
On the Break Up of Oneida, 14 CONN. L. REV. 717 (1982); and works cited therein. There
were many references to Oneida at the trial, see, e.g., 2 Trial, supra note 1, at 2145 (Scoville),
and testimony concerning Guiteau at Oneida was submitted by the aged J.H. Noyes. See also
The Lesson of President Garfield's Assassination, 6 AM. CATH. Q. REV. 683, 689 (1888) (dis-
cussing Oneida and Mormons, stating that "Conscience cannot be altogether deadened and to
silence it, men invent religions to justify criminal deeds").
George Beard believed that, "While the mere going to the Oneida Community was not in
itself a proof of insanity, yet for an energetic, able, and ambitious man to leave his studies and
break up all his planned of life, exile himself from home and friends and rush to this society,
was as immoral and frantic an act as could well be committed...." G. BEARD, THE CASE OF
GUITEAU-A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY 25 (1882).
The English psychiatrist John Bucknill, recalling the fact that Guiteau's father was a
follower of Noyes, suggested that "probably it would not be too much to say that the assassina-
tion of President Garfield was the outcome of Oneida" (1882-1883). Bucknill, The Plea of
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to the intent."'' 36
The state's response to the Pocasset murder illustrates one point
which is entirely consistent with the general impression we have of
Guiteau's execution as the response of an outraged nation to a Presi-
dential assassination. At least in a case which did not involve a regi-
cide (and which did involve sensory delusions) the law of insanity 'in
late 19th century America could perfectly well understand that an
insane delusion of divine command might serve as a basis for the legal
insanity.'3 7 Two other points, perhaps less obvious, are also sug-
gested. First, even in a case like that of Charles Freeman, some peo-
ple saw fanaticism and not insanity, and insisted that punishment was
the appropriate response of the state. Even the conclusion that Free-
man was insane, in short, was not altogether obvious. Second, a large
question relating to the debate over the authenticity of biblical reli-
gion might be opened by one's approach to cases like that of Freeman
or Guiteau. Even those who agreed that there had been in fact no
divine command to kill might disagree to a troublesome extent about
why they thought so.
IV. A STATE TRIAL IN CHRISTENDOM
Kings, as we think, are made by men. Jurors, according to our
Insanity in the Case of Charles Guiteau, 39 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INSANITY 181, 197 (1882-
1883).
Gray thought that the time at Oneida was "doubtless the turning point" of Guiteau's life.
Gray wrote "It showed itself in an awful perversion of intellectual activity and misdirected
religious thought, which shattered to fragments all the moral sanctions of human law, and all
the sacred institutions of civil society, with all the guarantees of personal accountability, and
made him the sport of an unbridled egotism by self-delusions, though a pretense of individual
union with the Divine will and Divine authority .. " Gray, The Guiteau Trial, supra note I,
at 312.
136. The Pocasset Murder. The Independent May 15, 1879.
137. The insanity defense in the Freeman case was analyzed just after the events in the
ALBANY LAW JOURNAL: In sacrificing his daughter, "Freeman apparently considered that he
was acting under the direct command of God as revealed to him in dreams and visions." If the
sanity defense was used the "jury must be instructed to find according to the 'right and wrong'
test in The McNaughten's (sic) case." The journal also cited Commonwealth v. Rogers on
monomania. Stone, Legal Aspects of the Pocasset Affair, X ALBANY LAW J. 71 (1879). In
terms of the legal test of insanity often referred to as the right/wrong test, there is an ambigu-
ity in the word "wrong" as used in the formal statement of the rule. The problem was summa-
rized by James Fitzjames Stephen as follows:
(3) A kills B knowing that he is killing B, and knowing that it is illegal to kill B, but under
an insane delusion that the salvation of the human race will be obtained by his execution for
the murder of B, and that God has commanded him (A] to produce that result by those means.
A's act is a crime if the word "wrong" means illegal. It is not a crime if the word means
morally wrong.
J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 149 (1883).
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theory of the law, are made by God, and it is in His image that they
act and speak...
Judge Porter to the Jury 3 '
Since no one but (arguably) Guiteau took seriously his "higher
law" defense of Abrahamic insanity, the law could operate in its own
categories. Avoiding the higher law question posed by a divine com-
mand to murder in which people believed, the system could deal with
the legal implications of Guiteau's possible belief in his own inspira-
tion. But it was exactly this certainty that there had been no divine
command to Guiteau to kill James Garfield which created another
problem clearly seen in connection with the Freeman case. As the
Independent noted, the question of importance posed by Freeman's
murder of his daughter was not essentially legal, and it was a question
"6asked much more in private than in public:"
If it was a horrible offense for Freeman to offer his child as a sacri-
fice, at what he believed fully to be God's command, why was it
not just as horrible an offense for Abraham to try to do the same?
In other words, if the nature of the fact supposed to be commanded
proves that it could not have come from God in the case of Free-
man, can the same command have come from God in the case of
Abraham?' 39
This would, the newspaper suggested, be a "fresh" question to some,
"because in the story which we have heard from our childhood the
element of horror is absent ... ." But clearly the problem was that
"what was faith in Abraham we call fanaticism now.""
Some ministers considered the divine origin of a command to kill
very explicitly when discussing Freeman. When a person comes
claiming "that he has received a divine command to sacrifice his
138. 2 Trial supra note i, at 2268.
139. Id. Rosenberg refers to The Independent as "one of the country's more influential
weeklies." ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 23.
140. Abraham, Isaac and Pocasset, The Independent, May 22, 1879, at 14, col. 1. It has
been noted that for the modern reader, the story of Genesis 22 is extraordinarily difficult.
"Modern readers find the picture of God's temptation of Abraham to sacrifice his own son
repulsive. The horror which human sacrifice excites makes it hard for them to see how God
could utter such a command even when it is not seriously intended, or how Abraham could.
have accepted such a command as a true divine revelation .. " McKenzie, The Sacrifice of
Isaac (Gen. 22), 9 SCRIPTURE 79 (1957).
On "the legends and lore of the command to Abraham to offer Isaac as a sacrifice," see S.
SPIEGEL, THE LAST TRIAL (J. Goldin trans. 1969).
The treatment of Abraham by Kierkegaard (FEAR AND TREMBLING), while published in
1843, was not available in English until the twentieth century. Krauschoor, Kierkegaard in




child," and then he "cites the Old Testament command to Abraham
to slay Isaac, and the New Testament belief in the resurrection of a
slain body to support him.. ." how should one respond? 14 1 One re-
sponse to Freeman's acts was an attack on uncritical biblical literal-
ism and dogmatic theology. Freeman "has been taught from his
infancy to read this [the story of Abraham] as an exemplary and typi-
cal act, some argued, but he really "needed somebody bold enough to
tell him that the record was only the story of a savage superstitious
Arab. It's all true enough, no doubt, but it's only a true and beautiful
story about an old patriarchal tramp who lived in the early and primi-
tive ages of the world, but who if he lived today would be sent to the
penitentiary or insane asylum. His act was very fitting and proper in
an age of superstition and ignorance, but today it would be simply
infamous." But this reading, one minister noted, "will be called sacri-
legious by the Methodists of this city, simply because they have in-
vested the Bible with a superstitious reverence, and have been
accustomed to override the noblest and purest instincts of our nature
by commending such characters for examples." "The truth is," the
clergyman concluded, that Abraham "is a picture of human nature
and a character worth studying, but he is no more worthy of our imi-
tation today than a Fall River tramp would be."' 42
In a discussion called "The Pocasset Tragedy: The Legitimate
Fruit of Christianity," the free thinker and spiritualist William
Denton emphatically pointed out: "When this man is tried," he said,
"Christianity and Judaism will be tried," for did not Freeman have
"as much right to obey what he believed, and still believes, was the
command of God, as Abraham had?" More than that, "If Abraham
is to be praised, and his faith commended, how much more should
Christians commend Freeman, who trusted when Abraham failed!"
As Denton recalled, "there were Christians saying that Freeman
should be hanged, that he was unfit to live." But, "when you hang
Freeman, you hang Abraham and Jehovah, who were equally guilty,
and condemn your religion, which was the parent of his crime." The
point for Denton was that the causes of the crime "not only belong to
orthodox Christianity, rather they are its very heart."' 143
141. Potter, The Commands of the Lord in A HISTORY OF THE POCASSET TRAGEDY WITH
THE THREE SERMONS PREACHED IN NEW BEDFORD BY REV. WILLIAM J. POTTER, REV.
C.S. NUTrER & REV. W.C. STILES 13 [hereinafter HISTORY OF THE POCASSET TRAGEDY].
142. Stiles, The Bible and Human Reason in HISTORY OF THE POCASSET TRAGEDY, at 3 1.
143. W. DENTON, THE POCASSET TRAGEDY: THE LEGITIMATE FRUIT OF CHRISTIANITY
28 (1882). This pamphlet (not listed in McDades bibliography, The Annals of Murder) can be
found in the Denton collection at the University of Pennsylvania and at the Newberry Library.
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And finally, it is interesting to see the reaction of the American
Socialist, " the newspaper of the Oneida Community, to the Pocasset
murder. Certainly, the community frequently attacked for its own
religious behavior did not attempt to defend Freeman. Their newspa-
per referred to Freeman's "fanaticism," and "wickedness." But the
community's essential position was that clergy and religious journals
"only made-lame apologies" for Abraham when they argued that
"owing to his barbaric conditions and surroundings he was led astray,
or that he misunderstood the command of God, or that the record
itself is an example of oriental extravagance and, therefore, is untrust-
worthy as history." The true position to take, the American Social-
ist' 45 urged, "was that Abraham had been for a long lifetime in open
communication with the angelic world. . ." and when he was put to
the "severest possible test of faith, his obedience was perfect." Abra-
ham's was a "noble, godlike act, and fully justified by the results." By
Abraham's act it was "forever demonstrated that in the religion of the
God of Abraham, obedience is better than sacrifice,"' 46 and that in
that religion, human sacrifices never were to have a place.
Not surprisingly, the Guiteau case led to similar arguments
about the biblical literalism in the Abraham and Isaac story.'47 While
some observers envisioned Guiteau as drawing his inspiration from
I appreciate the courtesy of both of these institutions. See also W.H. LIrrTLEOHN, THE PO-
CASSET TRAGEDY: FREEMAN NOT A SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTIST (1879). I have been unable
to locate a copy of Poor Little Edith Freeman. The Pocasset Fanatics - Chal Freeman, the
"Second Adventist" imagining himself another Abraham slays his little daughter, offering up his
darling child as a human sacrifice. (Phila. 1879) (listed in McDade's bibliography as item
322). It is neither, I am advised, in the collection of the American Antiquarian Society (Mc-
Dade's reference) nor the collection of the Pennsylvania State Library (N.U.C. reference).
144. The Pocasset Tragedy, American Socialist, May 29, 1879. The Perfectionist spokes-
man then argued the group's central theological proposition, that the Second Coming had
already occurred. Freeman and wife and neighbors "carried their fanaticism to extreme wick-
edness"; and might be condemned and living, or imprisoned for life." There is, significantly,
no emphasis on the insanity issue here.
Perfectionism, too, could be considered in the context of barbaric Christianity. Thus,
Reverend Powell wrote, "I wish it were possible.. ." he said, "to say that 'all the blame lay on
such fanatical institutions' as Oneida. But we are quite entitled to say to Noyes & Co., 'your
inspiration is a lie, but ours is the truth?' You go back to patriarchal times, to Abraham and
concubinage, for your ideal; we go back only to Apostolic times .... " POWELL, GUITEAU
FROM A THEOLOGICAL STANDPOINT 7 (1881).
The Millerite excitement earlier in the century also came up at the Guiteau trial as illus-
trating fanaticism but not insanity. See 2 Trial, supra note I, at 1368.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See Reddy, Abraham's Inspiration in the Offering of Isaac, His Son, CHRISTIAN AD-
VOCATE, March 30, 1882. "The blasphemous use of the case of Abraham by Guiteau and its




atheism, and "from the fashionable Godless theories that flood the
public press and public mind,"' 48 and The New York Times (in an
odd example of denial) suggested parallels in the writings of the an-
cient Greeks, 49 a number of observers, particularly those associated
with liberal Christianity and more secular orientations, saw Guiteau
as someone who stood solidly within one aspect of the Christian tradi-
tion. These writers used the case of Guiteau, as some had used the
case of Freeman, to press home a call for critical reason. Moncure
Conway, noted that a day might come when a plea for Guiteau might
argue that he was a victim of the worst teachings of morbid [Chris-
tian] dogma which were impressed on his mind in early life and were
exaggerated by his morbid temperament. Guiteau was taught that the
supreme object of existence was to save his own soul-that first lesson
in selfishness taught to millions of children (which only the re-
straining grace of human nature prevents from making them soul-
less!) "and was trained to believe that with God, human goodness
availed nothing." He was taught "that death was a small affair, and
to a Christian great gain, passage from an accursed world to a blissful
paradise." And, finally, the "only fatally wicked thing was to him
unbelief." These dogmas, Conway said, "were given him as the
guides of his life," but, they were "a perilous kind of teaching."' 5°
The relationship of Guitean to traditional christianity was at
least once elaborately presented in a sermon. Reverend E.P. Powell
of Utica New York offered this analysis: "Guitean insists that he was
the subject of special divine inspirations." Theologically, Reverend
Powell said, inspiration is not absurd, but an allowed possibility. In-
deed, [belief in inspiration is a necessity] .... Eternal death or misery
hangs on the blasphemy of denying inspiration."' 5'1
Reverend Powell then debated the point with an imaginary an-
tagonist: "You answer that the inspiration of Guiteau is impossible"
since this is a "case of murder and God would not inspire a man to do
148. See T. EASTON, ISRAEL'S BEAUTY SLAIN 14 (1881), for a sermon associating Guiteau
with the Nihilistic contempt of all "authority, human, or divine, which feeds upon and springs
out of the rotten compost of Atheism."
149. The New York Times said: "It is a very strange recreation of the meddling pagan
Gods of the Greek mythology that Guiteau has attempted. There is a very curious and com-
plete parallelism between the view of the crime and the most striking feature of the theology of
the Greeks. Their theory of the nature of the Gods and of their relations with men was pre-
cisely that which Guiteau pretends to hold of the Divine nature and its manifestations in our
day." New York Times, January 1, 1882, at 6, col. 6.
150. M. CONWAY, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF GARFIELD:, A DISCUSSION BEFORE THE
SOUTH PLACE RELIGIOUS SOCIETY 17-18 (1881).
151. E. POWELL, GUITEAU FROM A THEOLOGICAL STANDPOINT 2-3 (1881).
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evil." But, said Rev. Powell, consider Abraham and Isaac. It is true
first that Isaac was saved, and second that it "looks very much as if it
was a story coming down from days of human sacrifice, when parents
were accustomed to offer up their firstlings to. their gods." But still,
said Powell, "It is clear that Abraham meant to obey God and in-
tended to kill his boy. It did not occur to him that it was impossible
that Jehovah should inspire murder." And if Guiteau calls it remov-
ing Garfield; perhaps Abraham called it removing Isaac. And then
the next question, "You claim that Guiteau if he really believes he
was inspired was insane." But, Powell said, "Is such a claim proof of
insanity?" What can then be said of the writers of the Bible? "What
do you say is the mental condition of a man who will affirm that
SOME ONE (Sic)ELSE is inspired? Is he also a crank? He recalled
the Meadow Orchard Massacre in Utah.'5 2 "A devilish affair you say;
implying it was inspired of the devil. But how can one know? How
shall he determine his inspiration? You answer by searching prayer,
but that of course was what Guiteau did."
Finally, Reverend Powell said, "there seems to be but one safe
course; and that is to understand that the reason is the only possible
guide to duty." And, he concluded, "It is pleasant to believe that this
trial is compelling theorists to ask how do we know that any man was
ever inspired by God-and they must ask further-are we not respon-
sible for Guiteauism." It is, he said, "a very healthy sign that men
begin to pronounce it a proof of insanity to claim inspiration."' 153
Robert Ingersoll blamed the clergy for charging the assassination
to infidelity and insisted on seeing Guiteau as a Christian. "I am ex-
ceedingly glad that Guiteau is not an Infidel," he said, "I am glad that
he believes the Bible, glad that he has delivered lectures against what
he calls Infidelity, and glad that he has been working for years with
the missionaries and evangelists of the United States." Guiteau, In-
gersoll said, "is a man of small brain, badly balanced, [who] believes
the Bible to be the word of God., He believes in the reality of heaven
and hell. He believes the miraculous. He is surrounded by the super-
natural .. ." and, Ingersoll, insisted, "when a man throws away his
reason, of course no one can tell what he will do. He is liable to
become a devotee or an assassin, a saint or a murderer; he may die in
a monastery or in a penitentiary. '
152. Id. at 4.
153. Id.
154. THE WORKS OF ROBERT INGERSOLL 102-03 (Dresen 1900). See also M. MARTY,
THE INFIDEL: FREE THOUGHT AND AMERICAN RELIGION (1961).
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The invocation of Abraham by Guiteau raised, then, a trouble-
some problem because it came all too close to a debate between liberal
and orthodox Christianity, orthodoxy maintaining that the bibical ac-
count was true, but that the age of revelation was over, while liberals
suggested that the biblical account itself was open to question. Under
the argument of Guiteau's insanity and the question of reason and
unreason, there was, in short, a sensitive issue which related to reason
and revelation. Orthodoxy's answer to Guiteau was provided by peo-
ple at the trial, including Gray, Porter and Davidge. In explicitly reli-
gious terms, the editor of the Christian Advocate quoted the New
Testament (James 13): "There is nothing new in this case. St. James
understood it, and states every principle involved in it: Let no man
say when he is tempted, I AM TEMPTED OF GOD; for God cannot
be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man: But every man is
tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed. Then,
when lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin; and sin, when it is
finished, bringeth forth death."' 5  Prosecutor Davidge quoted the
same passage at the trial: "[t]hat was the inspiration," he said, and
"[t]hat is my commentary generally upon what you have heard here
in respect of divine pressure. "156
An English psychiatrist also responded to Guiteau's argument in
religious terms. He suggested that the judge and jury might say: "We
also believe in the inspiration of the Almighty, and we have prayed to
Him that He will enable us to give a just judgment upon you, and our
judgment, inspired by Him who is the source of all justice, is that you
are Guilty, as indicated, and that you must suffer the penalty of your
crime." 57
Finally, Guiteau was hanged and as Professor Rosenberg indi-
cated, it is "only common sense" to say that no jury would have ac-
quitted him. The death of Garfield meant the death of Guiteau. Dr.
Godding, Superintendent of Washington's Hospital for the Insane,
wrote later: "I said then, If the President dies, no plea of insanity can
save this man from the gallows; if the President lives, no commission
of lunacy will fail to find him insane .... " ' Similarly, Dr. George
Beard, the well-known neurologist, was convinced of Guiteau's in-
155. Buckley, A Study of Guiteau, Christian Advocate, Jan. 12, 1882, at 18, col. 2.
156. 2 Trial, supra note 1, at 1918.
157. Bucknill, The Pleas of Insanity in the Case of Charles Julius Guiteau, 39 Am. J. IN-
SANITY 181, 198 (1882-1883) (reprinted from BRAIN 1882).
158. W. GODDING, Two HARD CASES: SKETCHES FROM A PHYSICIAN'S PORTFOLIO 37-38
(1882).
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sanity and believed that Guiteau would not even have been tried if he
had killed a common citizen or had missed the President. "There is
no asylum in the world, public or private" Beard wrote, "that would
not have taken Guiteau at once, at any time during the past twenty
years, and kept him as long as his friends desired to have him remain,
on the certificate of any physicians who might or might not have known
anything about insanity,"" 9 And reformer Wendell Phillips explicitly
and with some intensity deplored the motivations likely" to be involved
in any execution of Guiteau: "if, carried away by hot revenge, the
people hang him, it will be a blot on the justice of the American peo-
ple which probably within five years, men would do anything to
erase." History would record it, Phillips said, "as one of the most
lamentable instances of temporary madness, or as evidence how much
of actual barbarism lingers in the bosom of an intelligent and so-called
Christian community.""tW
But what else did the judgment mean? Is it possible to say more
than that a century ago the assassin of a President had to die at the
hands of the legal system? Of course, we can never really know why
the jury decided as it did. It is to be assumed that the jurors believed
that there had been no revelation to Guiteau in fact. For the rest, the
jurors may have simply thought that Charles Guiteau was lying and
that he did not believe in the idea of his own inspiration. Or they may
have believed that because there was no claim of sensory experience
there was no "delusion" according to the law as laid down by Judge
Walter Cox. Or they may have thought that Guiteau believed that he
was "inspired," but that his belief (as some had argued concerning
Charles Freeman) was simply punishable fanaticism.
Perhaps this much is also true, however: any trial which is so
elaborately discussed in public has social and religious aspects larger
than the technical legal problems involved. 6' "Many of the features
159. Beard, The Case of Guiteau: A Psychological Study, 9 JOURNAL OF NERVOUS DIs-
EASES 9 (1882). (Emphasis in original) For Beard's brief appearance at the trial, see 2 Trial,
supra note I at 1718.
160. Phillips, The Death Penalty, 133 NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW 550, 559 (1881).
161. Thus, Paul Carter on the highly publicized civil suit of Henry Ward Beecher (brought
in 1875 by Theodore Tilton, for alienation of affections): "Conceivably Tilton v. Beecher was
one of the great symbolic trials, like those of Bukharin or Dreyfus or Alger Hiss-the kind in
which in the minds of partisans the accused must be guilty or must be innocent because of
larger issues that turn upon that guilt or innocence." P. CARTER, THE SPIRITUAL CRISIS OF
THE GILDED AGE 118 (1971). Professor Carter is careful to state that we cannot tell how
many people rejected this reading of the trial's significance. Id. at 248 and n.4 1. See generally
W. MCLAUGHLIN, THE MEANING OF HENRY WARD BEECHER: AN ESSAY IN THE SHIFTING
VALUES OF MID-VICTORIAN AMERICA 1840-1870 (1970).
If things other than the speeches of doctors and lawyers were important in the Guiteau
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of the personal history of Guiteau will be recognized," John Gray
wrote in the American Journal of Insanity: "They are by no means
uncommon or incredible in our days, under the system of extreme
liberty, not to say license, both of opinions and conduct allowed by
the institutions of modern civilization."
In an age when almost all authority is disregarded as to religious
belief and social conduct, it is not extraordinary to find even the
most destructive principles as well as the most transparent impos-
tures brought under the cloak of religion, until society is almost
forced to inquire how far the 'rights of conscience' are to be
respected when the good order and peace of the State begin to be
imperiled. '62
Gray's emphasis on authority in relation to religious belief and opin-
ion as well as practice is obvious, and not surprisingly, he linked this
breakdown to authority to the problems posed by Mormonism and
loose divorce laws.
'Finally, it is entirely possible that as important as contending
psychiatrists' speeches, and the jury instructions given by Judge Cox,
were the comments of Judge Porter t63 for the prosecution, particu-
larly his long speech to the jury. 61 Judge Cox in his instructions sug-
gested two pictures of religious belief, one sane and one insane, for the
jury to examine. But neither picture is comparable to the one drawn
by Judge Porter, who raised quite a different image in refutation of
both Guiteau's arguments and the arguments of the defense psychia-
trists. Porter's address was described as "devoted largely to portray-
ing and denouncing with scathing invective the character of the
accused... It described the prisoner as a monster of iniquity....,, 6s
But these denunciations had a very particular quality. Repeatedly,
Porter associated Guiteau with the devil,' 66 and suggested that argu-
trial, what other things were they? Mitchell, The Man Jfrho Murdered Garfield, 67 MASS.
HIST. SOCIETY PROCEEDINGS 452 (1941), stresses the testimony of Guiteau's former wife,
Mrs. Theodore Dunmire, to the effect that she had never seen anything indicating that Guiteau
was a man of unsound mind. Id. at 475 (quoting 1 Trial, supra note 1, at 1165-66). Mitchell
writes that this testimony "probably did more to send [Guiteaul to the gallows than all the
lawyers and doctors put together." Id. at 475.
162. Gray, The Guiteau Trial, 38 AM. J. INSANITY 303, 309 (1882).
163. Porter, who had briefly been a judge in New York, was one of those representing
Beecher (and Christianity?) in the Beecher-Tilton trial. See also Biographical Sketch ofJohn
K. Porter (1819-1892), N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N REPORTS 125-30 (1893).
164. For Rosenberg's summary, see supra note 1, at 200-01.
165. Guiteau's Trial, APPLETON'S ANNUAL CYCLOPEDIA AND REGISTER OF IMPORTANT
EVENTS 381, 394 (1881).
166. The present emphasis on Porter, and this highly literal reading of his speech, does not
deny the importance of tendencies represented to Spitzka or others of a secularist mentality.
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ments in support of Guiteau would excuse the ultimate evil. If Luci-
fer "happened to be on trial," Judge Porter said, "I wonder what Dr.
Spitzka would say of him."167
Porter was consistently aware of his religious context, and an
identification with the idea of a Christian Nation is evident in his re-
marks at the trial and in his long and emphatic speech. Porter argued
that his colleague "had shown greater forbearance in dealing with
Guiteau than that exercised in any state trial reported in Christen-
dom." He objected to a question "as irrelevant and blasphemous."'168
Even as a young man, Porter said, Guiteau had been "possessed of the
spirit of diabolism."' 69
Judge Porter also responded directly to the issue of Abrahamic
insanity. The insanity described as temporary mania or as moral in-
sanity or congenital monstrosity is, he said, "described better by that
most eminent scientist, Dr. Barker, as simple wickedness." It was
hereditary insanity, Porter said, but it is "inherited, not from the nat-
ural parent, but from another source."' I 0 Judge Porter said, "I re-
minded you yesterday, of the rebuke of the Savior to the scribes and
Pharisees: 'Those who are of the seed of Abraham prove it by doing
the works of Abraham: but we are the children of your father the
devil, who was a murderer from the beginning.'" This, said Porter, is
the order of hereditary insanity, which he has derived from the
source, laid bare by the Saviour of mankind, and of which you see so
striking an illustration in the prisoner's dock."'' Porter character-
The point is that Porter (and Gray) were in part engaged in a discussion of reality with others
whose world view no longer, as David Hall says, located truth in the Christian revelation.
Hall, The Victorian Connection, in VICTORIAN AMERICA 81 (D. Howe ed. 1976).
167. See 2 Trial supra note 1, at 2301. Porter argued that "the claim in the present case is,
that this man was so enormously wicked as to be, in the language of Dr. Spitzka, an absolute
'moral monstrosity'. But, said Porter, "He represents the distinctive class of whom the Savior
spoke, not as lunatics, but as possessed with devils." Id. at 2266 (emphasis added).
168. Id. at 1493.
169. Id. at 2230.
170. Id. at 2272-73.
171. Id. at 2305. A tone similar to that of the closing speech was evident also in Porter's
questioning of Guiteau. See I Trial, supra note I at 605. Professor Rosenberg's description of
Porter includes these aspects. Porter, he writes, was: "a most persistent questioner, Guiteau a
picture of frustration, unable to explain the simple truth of his inspiration to the older man....
Porter delighted as well in ridiculing Guiteau's theological pretensions-quoting Noyes' Ber-
ean to prove that the defendant had simply plagiarized his religious ideas from the Oneida
Community's founder." ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 141.
Porter's view of the case may be contrasted with the neutral statement offered by Judge
Cox:
The theory of the Government is that the defendant committed the homicide in
the full possession of his faculties and from perfectly sane motives; that he did the act
from revenge, or perhaps from a morbid desire for notoriety; that he calculated delib-
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ized Guiteau as diabolical. The word could carry, in addition to its
looser meaning, a specific literal reference. All this, it may be sug-
gested, is more clearly characterized as religious disputation than law.
erately upon being protected by those who were politically benefitted by the death of
the President and upon some ulterior benefit to himself; that he made no pretense to
inspiration at the time of the assassination, nor until he discovered that his expecta-
tions of help from the so-called stalwart wing of the Republican party were delusive,
and that these men were denouncing his deed, and that then for the first time, when
he saw the necessity of making .out some defense, he broached this theory of inspira-
tion and irresistible pressure, forcing him to the commission of the act.
2 Trial, supra note 1, at 2341-42.
The religious/secular theme emerged also in the examination of witnesses by the prosecu-
tion lawyers. Dr. Godding writes:
At the second question he drew out the fact that the witness [Kiernan] did not be-
lieve in a future state of rewards and punishments; and though this was not, strictly
speaking, a scientific refutation of the prisoner's insanity, it was in effect to make a
philistine of this witness to the jury, who had stated under oath that they believed in
the doctrines of the Christian religion.
W. GODDING, Two HARD CASES: SKETCHES FROM A PHYSICIAN'S PORTFOLIO 187
(1881). Rosenberg comments that "for many of the jurors, Kiernan's testimony could, from
that moment, be disregarded." ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 146.
See also the examination of Spitzka:
District Attorney Corkhill. Do you believe in God?
The Witness [Spitzkaj. If the court does not declare your question irrelevant-
The Court [Cox]. (Interposing) You are not obliged to answer that question,
doctor
[SpitzkaJ: I do on principle, decline to answer question ....
Corkhill: Then I understand you decline to answer whether you believe in God
or not?
Spitzka: I decline to answer it on principle, as from my point of view, an imper-
tinent question in a country that guarantees civil and religious liberty.
Mr. Davidge: Irreligious liberty. 1 Trial, supra note 1, at 1007. The defense
also cited the Bible, attempting to persuade the jury to feel compassion for a lunatic.
2 Trial, supra note 1, at 1948-49.
On devilish delusions as against insane delusions, see id. at 2310; 1 Trial, supra
note 1, at 690. Also "this malignant, diabolical, crafty, calculating cold-blooded
murderer" 2 Trial, supra note 1, at 2305; see also "whether the devil that possess this
man, is or is not to be checked by the mandate of law .... Id. at 2667.
Was there, then, a different defense available? See Wharton: then as to the
alleged supernatural powers of Satan. Now the existence of Satan as a tempter is not
denied; all that we deny is his absolute power as a coercer. The law of the land united
with Scripture in affirming the existence of such a tempter. 'Moved and seduced by
the instigation of the devil' is the allegation which the prosecution makes in every
indictment for a heinous crime. 'I was coerced to do so by supernatural agency' is a
defense, which, unless there be proof of insanity aliunde, is never tolerated. This is
one of the points in which the common law had adopted the divine word as part of
itself.
WHARTON, A TREATISE ON MENTAL UNSOUNDNESS EMBRACING A GENERAL VIEW OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL LAW § 645, at 628 (1873).
Porter attempted to persuade the jury to judge Guiteau on moral and not only legal stan-
dards. Thus, "Gentlemen, it is well for us all that the law does not call on jurors to leave the
only immortal part of their nature, their moral nature, at the courthouse door when they enter
it to administer justice." 2 Trial, supra note 1, at 2662.
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Finally, Judge Porter was invoking a standard of religious orthodoxy
against a blasphemer, a fanatic, and a murderer.
CONCLUSION
The people of this nation, neurologist George Beard observed in
1881, have "been pressed constantly with these three questions: How
shall we keep from starving? Who shall be the next president? And
where shall we go when we die?"172 The work of historians, including
legal historians, has usually focused on the problems raised by the
first two questions. Perhaps because of what Martin Marty calls the
"Modem Schism,"' 173 the scholarship relating broadly to the third
question has become part of church history, one of the tunnels 7"
through which historians view the past. Yet the events in the Guiteau
trial had a relation to that third question. In a case involving the
insanity defense, "the decision between guilt and insanity has a sym-
bolism transcending an individual's fate."' 17 Sometimes that symbol-
ism touches the most profound issues not only of morals and ethics
but of ultimate realities. The result of the Guiteau trial is what the
jury decided on the question of Guiteau's insanity. That is clear
enough. More difficult is the problem of determining what the jurors
really thought about Guiteau's defense. Perhaps they thought that he
was lying. Perhaps that he was blaspheming. Perhaps that he was
simply sane, according to the contemporary law.
It has been argued here that Guiteau's assertion that he was like
Abraham meant more to his time than it does to ours, and that the
legal responses to that assertion, in a culture which debated the literal
truth of the Bible, contained reflections of that large debate. Reading
the trial of Guiteau as an intersection of legal and religious issues, one
may suggest the following: In finding Charles Guiteau sane and
guilty of the assassination of James Garfield, a jury could have been
doing several things in addition to declaring an individual assassin
guilty of murder. If the jury considered the case in the light suggested
here, it would have been ruling against the agnostic materialism of
defense psychiatrists, Spitzka and Kiernan, and for the religious or-
thodoxy represented by prosecution lawyer, John Porter, and prose-
172. G. BEARD, AMERICAN NERVOUSNESS: ITS CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 128
(1881).
173. M. MARTY, THE MODERN SCHISM: THREE PATHS TO THE SECULAR 9 (1969).
174. J. HEXTER, REAPPRAISALS IN HISTORY: NEW VIEWS ON HISTORY AND SOCIETY IN
EARLY MODERN EUROPE 258 (2d ed. 1979).
175. R. SMITH, TRIAL BY MEDICINE 3 (1982).
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cution psychiatrist, John Gray. It would also have been implicitly
denouncing a form of religious fanaticism widely understood as analo-
gous to that of the Mormons and the Oneida Perfectionists, a fanati-
cism associated in the minds of contemporary observers with a
number of crimes and immoralities of which the assassination of Pres-
ident Garfield was the latest and most terrible example.

